Liberty, Liberalism, and Neutrality:
Labor Preemption and First Amendment Values
Harry G. Hutchison*
The liberal-legalist order .

.

. will be founded on self-interested,

rights bearing, adversarial individuals and this will not be sustainable. This type of social order is likely to aggravate precisely those
points of tension in society which any vibrant political process
should aim at alleviating. The ultimate danger is that liberallegalism, may, paradoxically, bring about the precise enddespotism-which, it is designed to avoid.'

I.

INTRODUCTION

For more than two hundred years, American lawyers, judges, and
legal academics have been looking for a fully persuasive theory that
would justify the judicial invalidation of statutes on grounds that they
fail to satisfy the judiciary's understanding of what the Constitution
requires.2 Nowhere is this clearer than within the domain instantiated by the intersection of fundamental freedoms, such as the freedom of speech and the doctrine of preemption, 3 and burgeoning efforts by states to regulate labor organizing and collective bargaining.4

* Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. Elizabeth McKay,
Adam Mossoff, Paul Secunda, and Ilya Somin provided helpful comments on earlier
drafts of this article. The usual caveat applies. My research was entirely supported by
funds provided by the Law & Economics Center at George Mason University School
of Law.
I MARTIN LOUGHLIN, SWORD & SCALES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP

BETWEEN LAW & POLITICS 5 (2000).
2 JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE:
USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 50 (1997).
3 See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408, 2413-14

(2008).

4 Many of these efforts are sparked by academic and labor-union commentary
that reflects disappointment with rates of unionization in the private sector. These
trends reveal a continuing and persistent decline in unionization over the last several
decades. In response, academic conferences have emerged to stem the decline. See,
e.g., Symposium, Next Wave Organizing, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 303 (2005). Various
methods have been proposed including new approaches to organizing that emphas-
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In Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Brown, the United States
Supreme Court offered one theory of judicial invalidation that protects employers' freedom of speech claims and reinvigorates federal
preemption doctrine within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).' Prescinding from an architectonic conception of
freedom of speech that is supported forcefully and explicitly by the
First Amendment, the Court relied on preemption doctrine to invalidate two provisions of a California statute 6 because the enactment
constitutes regulation, which intrudes into a zone that is "protected
and reserved for market freedom."7 The Court properly upheld its
previous stance permitting employers to speak directly to their employees about unionization,8 but supporters of this decision might do
well to withhold their applause.
While a continuing debate erupts with regard to whetherjustices
since Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., have been looking to the judiciary
as a means of subverting or fortifying the Constitution,9 it is clear
from the Supreme Court's 1941 decision in NLRB v. Virginia Electric
& Power Co. that nothing in the NLRA prohibits an employer "from
expressing its view on labor policies or problems," 0 unless the employer's speech is coercive within the meaning of the Act." Virginia

ize smarter organizing, bargaining to organize, reducing employer opposition, building public support for unions and the enactment of state and local laws designed to
change the organizing environment. See Fred Feinstein, Renewing and Maintaining
Union Vitality: New Approach to Union Growth, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 337, 337-53

(2005).

Chamber of Commerce, 128 S. Ct. at 2412-18.
The California state statute is known as "Assembly Bill 1889" (AB 1889)
and
prohibits several classes of employers that receive state funds "from using the funds
,to assist, promote, or deter union organizing."' CAL. GOV'T CODE § 16645.1 (a)
(Deering 2009). Two provisions of the statute were in issue: sections 16645.2 and
16645.7. Chamber of Commerce, 128 S. Ct. at 2412.
7 Chamber of Commerce, 128 S.
Ct. at 2412.
8 Id. at 2413-14 (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537-39 (1945)).
Harry V. Jaffa, OriginalIntent and the American Soul, 6 CLAREMONT REv. BOOKs
36, 36 (2005).
10 NLRB v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477 (1941).
1 See, e.g., Thomas, 323 U.S. at 537-38 (1945) (characterizing Virginia Electric
&
Power as a case that recognizes the First Amendment right of employers to engage in
non-coercive speech about unionization); see also Matthew T. Bodie, Information and
the Marketfor Union Representation,94 VA. L. REV. 1, 7-11 (2008) (discussing difficulties
in assessing whether employer coercion has taken place and pointing out that
though NLRA section 8(a)(1) disallows employer conduct that interferes with, restrains, or coerces employees who were exercising rights protected under section 7).
Difficulties arise when an employer engages in campaign activities that might intimidate or coerce yet not violate section 8(a)(1). Id. at 7. This line becomes fuzzy
"when an employer is trying to convince employees of the negative consequence of
5

6
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Electric & Power supports the proposition that employers have a First
Amendment right to engage in non-coercive speech about unionization. 2 Labor sanctions, if imposed, are not for the punishment of
employers but rather for the protection of employees; thus, employers are free to take any side and express any view on labor policies or
problems in the absence of adducible evidence bearing upon the issue of coercion.
Claims that employers possess free speech rights have spawned
thorny debates about whether (1) employer speech rests on a wobbly
foundation, (2) states can somehow limit the employer's free speech
right,14 and (3) the proposition tied to Virginia Electric & Powerstates
a rule that can be defended sufficiently as a component of federal
supremacy. Freedom-of-expression disputes frequently prompt uncertainty about whether employer and union expression tied to the
merits of an ongoing labor controversy warrant full First Amendment
protection,1 5 or whether such expression, like commercial advertising, holds only a "subordinate position" on the scale of First Amendment values 6 and thus justifies a lower level of judicial scrutiny. In
deciding freedom-of-expression disputes regarding the chargeability
of union dues to union dissenters, the Supreme Court, in an early union dues case, found that such disputes can force First Amendment
issues," such as those initially raised but reserved in Railway Employees'
union representation." Id. at 9. "Ultimately there is no clear line between impermissible threats and permissible campaign rhetoric." Id. at 11.
12 Chamber of Commerce, 128 S. Ct. at
2413.
13 Va. Elec. & Power, 314 U.S. at 477. Where a party to an organizing campaign
engages in non-coercive speech, the employer or union may still be subject to a
NLRB order, setting aside a representation election even though such a remedy impinges on the party's freedom-of-expression rights to some extent. ROBERT A.
GORMAN & MATTHEW W. FINKIN, BAsic TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND

COLLEcTIVE BARGAINING 177 & n.9 (2004) (discussing Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. NLRB,
451 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1971)).
14 See, e.g., Paul M. Secunda, Toward the Viability of State-Based Legislation
to Address
Workplace CaptiveAudience Meetings in the United States, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'YJ. 209,
210-16 [hereinafter Secunda, Toward the Viability of State-Based Legislation] (supporting state efforts to limit employers' ability to speak to workers in their facilities); Paul
M. Secunda, Debate, The Ironic Necessity for State Protection of Workers, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNuMBRA 20, 20-26 (2008), www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/Workplace
Federalism.pfd (same).
15 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (stating that the First Amendment
safeguards are applicable to business or economic activity).
16 Louis M. SEIDMAN ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT, 195 (2003); see also Glickman
v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 473 n.16 (1997) (distinguishing between union forced-dues cases and generic advertising program, with the latter being
less likely to pose a First Amendment burden).
17 Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996, 1004 (9th
Cir. 1970) (citing
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 763-64 (1961)).
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Department v. Hanson8 to the surface. 0 This provokes two corresponding queries: First, should First Amendment issues be reserved
and if so why? And second, should disputes concerning the chargeability of union dues provide persuasive or analogical guidance to
courts regarding disputes about employer free speech rights, particularly because the Supreme Court insists that "a significant impairment
of First Amendment rights must survive exacting scrutiny"?2 0 This Article will not attempt to answer both questions but will focus on the
issue of whether NLRA preemption doctrine is strong enough to
withstand an onrushing tide of disapproval coming from labor unions
and their allies. This tidal wave of opinion, however under-theorized,
appears calculated to stem the precipitous decline in private sector
unionization, to prevent collective action from becoming an anachronism, and to eliminate presumed employer coercion-which some
observers maintain is an impregnable barrier to employees' rights to
favor unionization. 2'
Presumably, freedom-of-expression contentions are fraught with
challenges that exceed the competence of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board). Authority exists for the proposition
that freedom-of-expression claims within a union dues context and
the policy behind the preemption doctrine are not served by deferring to the Board when a constitutional question is validly presented.22 This is so because constitutional adjudication trumps the
Board's interpretative expertise. Court adjudication, however, may
be only marginally better since prevailing canons of interpretation
require that the dispute be settled on grounds of statutory construction that ensure the statute is interpreted consistently with the Con10
19

Ry. Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956).
The United States Supreme Court recently decided a controversy involving the

first amendment in the labor context. See Locke v. Karass, 129 S. Ct. 798, 802 (2009).
The Supreme Court was called upon to answer this question: "May a State ... consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, condition continued public employment on the payment of agency fees for purposes of financing a monopoly bargaining agent's affiliates' litigation outside of a nonunion employee's bargaining
unit?"). Similar issues have arisen with respect to private sector labor unions as well.
See, e.g., Commc'n Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 745 (1988); Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 453 (1984).
20 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 259 (1977) (quoting Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976)).
21 SeeJamesJ. Brudney, Neutrality Agreement and Card Check
Recognition:Prospectsfor
ChangingParadigms,90 IOWA L. REv. 819, 819 (2005) (asserting that the NLRB election process is no longer normativelyjustified because the election paradigm regularly tolerates, encourages and promotes coercive conditions that preclude the attainment of employee choice).
Seay, 427 F.2d at 1002.
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stitution without reaching the constitutional claim itself.23 Hence,
freedom-of-expression rights often rest on constitutional principles
without being fully defended by the language of such principles.
An additional layer of complexity emerges because liberal democratic countries, such as the United States, have been drawn increasingly to moral pluralism as an outgrowth of the pursuit of postmodernism. Coherent with this deduction, Professor Alasdair MacIntyre
intuits that
[i]t is not just that we live too much by a variety and multiplicity of
fragmented concepts; it is that these are used at one and the same
time to express rival and incompatible social ideals and policies
and to furnish us with a pluralist political
rhetoric whose function
4
is to conceal the depth of our conflicts.1
Moral pluralism provides a platform for elastic adjudication' 5
and litigation. This interpretive tactic is contestable because statutory
construction, just like constitutional interpretation and correlative
political conflict, may not reveal the truth. Instead, a conscientious
examination of prevailing interpretative techniques applied to the
Constitution, legislative enactments, and the interstices of legislative
intent may disclose a flight from a pre-commitment to truthfulness, as
well as an isomorphic shift towards hypocrisy by the nation's elected
and appointed ethnarchs. 6 Evidence may be available suggesting
that such officials are predisposed to favor one side or another in the
contest for political power and then mask their partisanship by deploying the elastic rhetoric of neutrality.
Whatever the value may be of elastic statutory construction as a
substitute for principled constitutional interpretation, speechparticularly employer speech tied to an incipient labor dispute-can
be barred by the NLRB if it is found to be coercive. That observation
must be balanced by noticing Professors Gorman and Finkin's penetrating caveat:

Id. at 1003-04 (citing Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 763-64
(1961)).
24 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 253 (1984) (emphasis added).
25 Harry G. Hutchison, Reclaiming the First Amendment Through Union Dues Restric23

tions?, 10 U. PA. J. Bus. & EMPL. L. 663, 680 (2008) ("Unquestionably, postmodem
implications, and even postmodernism itself, ought to be embraced with caution rather than enthusiasm because the deficiencies in postmodern implications may impair postmodernism's ability to reclaim liberty and First Amendment values. In fact,
it may be difficult to define First Amendment values through postmodern discourse.").
26 See, e.g., DAVID RUNCIMAN, PoLTIcAL HyPOcRIs: THE
MASK OF POWER, FROM
HOBBES TO ORWELL AND BEYOND 2-6 (2008).
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[I]t is fair to say that many courts have in close cases tended to
give little deference to the Board's conclusions.... [instead] they
have tended to examine the issue of coercion rather independently and .. .have far more frequently substituted their own
finding of non-coercion for Board findings of coercion rather
17
than the reverse.
This conclusion is "explainable by the fact that federal regulation of
the flow of information in labor-election campaigns may trench upon
First Amendment protections, a setting naturally characterized by an
'uninhibited, robust and wide-open' exchange between labor and
management., 28 State initiatives that attempt to constrain employer
speech face similar impediments tied to the force of constitutional
values and the notion that the federal government has an interest in
maintaining a province that is characterized by a robust exchange of
ideas by labor and management. If the creation of a zone exemplified by robust exchange of views is an important objective, it can be
sustained through the doctrine of federal preemption. But preemption that relies on varying, if not inconsistent, statutory interpretation
may not always be enough to enforce employers' speech rights. Since
constitutional shelter for freedom of speech does not hinge on the
individual or corporate identity of the speaker, 9 it follows that if the
process of statutory interpretation tied to the doctrine of preemption
proves inadequate to protect employers' interests, this lacuna implies
the necessity of reclaiming the Constitution itself as a source of freedom for employers.
Despite the declaration that recent Supreme Court opinions
have accomplished a "Federalism Revolution" through decisions
strengthening state autonomy and authority,3 0 the Court's Chamber of
Commerce of the United States v. Brown opinion relies heavily on the doctrine set forth in Lodge 76, InternationalAss'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission.3 ' This reliance on the Machinists
27

GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 13, at 187.

Id. at 188.
Julie Marie Baworowsky, Note, From Public Square to Market Square: Theoretical
Foundations of First and Fourteenth Amendment Protection of CorporateReligious Speech, 83
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1713, 1748 (2008) (citing First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 777-80 (1978)).
30 Patrick M. Garry, Federalism'sBattle with History: The Inaccurate Associations
with
Unpopular Politics, 74 UMKC L. REV. 365, 365 (2005) ("After almost sixty years of
dormancy, federalism made a constitutional comeback in the 1990s.").
31 See, e.g., Harry G.Hutchison, Through the PruneyardCoherently: Resolving the Collision of PrivateProperty Rights and Nonemployee Union Access Claims, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 1,
18 (1994) ("In Lodge 76, InternationalAssociation of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Committee, [427 U.S. 132 (1976)], the United States Supreme Court dep28
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doctrine emphasizes that both the NLRB and the states are without
power "to regulate conduct that Congress intended" to be unregu32
lated but remain "controlled by the free play of economic forces."
According to the Court, "Machinist pre-emption is based on the premise that 'Congress struck a balance of protection, prohibition, and
laissez-faire in respect to union organization, collective bargaining,
and labor disputes.' 3 3 Presumably, state enactments, which upset
this balance, must give way to the federal interest.
On the other hand, a careful reading of the Chamber of Commerce
v. Lockyer opinion by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit shows that the court is skeptical that the Machinistscase established a constitutionally sufficient theory for invalidating the statute
at issue.3 4 Instead, the Ninth Circuit, unswerving from its irrepressible conception of the range of pro-union devices that can be deployed permissibly to strengthen unions and restrict freedom-ofexpression claims,3" reversed the district court and dismissed the
plaintiffs' claims.36 The Ninth Circuit's analysis is tied crucially to the
proposition that there is a principled difference between an organizing context and a collective bargaining one for purposes of judging
whether state regulation encroaches impermissibly on the federal
scheme.3 7 The court held that employer freedom-of-expression rights
are not constrained when the State of California exerts its sovereign

loyed a preemption doctrine that requires respect for economic weapons as part of
the free play of economic forces envisioned by the NLRA.").
32
Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408, 2412 (2008).
33
Id. (quoting Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wis. Employment Relations
Comm., 427 U.S. 132, 140 n.4 (1976)). On the other hand, Professor Paul Secunda
argues that in the absence of relatively equal economic power in the organizational
setting, the Machinistsdoctrine makes less sense than it does in the collective bargaining or protected concerted activity realm. E-mail from Paul Secunda, Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School, to Harry G. Hutchison (Oct. 17,
2008, 18:28 EST) (on file with author).
4
Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Lockyer, 463 F.3d 1076, 1085-90 (9th
Cir. 2006), rev'd sub nom., Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Brown 128 S. Ct. 2408
(2008); see also Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property and Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46
STAN. L. REv. 305, 341-42 (1994) (criticizing Machinists).
35
See Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 685 F.2d 1065, 1072-75 (9th Cir.
1982) (dismissing a freedom-of-expression challenge by union dissenters), rev'd, 466
U.S. 435 (1984); United Food & Comm'l Workers Union, Local 1036 v. NLRB, 307
F.3d 760 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that extra-bargaining unit organizing expenditures
are germane to collective bargaining and chargeable to nonmembers' dues ,despite
their freedom-of-expression objections).
Chamberof Commerce, 463 F.3d at 1082.
37 Id. at 1086-87.
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38

rights with respect to its spending power. Hence, the Ninth Circuit
upheld the contested provisions.
On the basis of its interpretation of the California statute and its
view of the doctrine of preemption, the Ninth Circuit decided that
the State of California was free to prevent certain employers from using state funds to assist, promote, or deter union organizing, against
the contrary claim that NLRA section 8(c) protects employers'
speech rights.4" Consequently, the employers' Commerce Clause and
freedom-of-expression claims' were unavailing. Convinced that the
state had a neutral purpose in enacting the contested legislation-to
avoid interfering with an employee's choice about whether to join or
to be represented by a labor union 42 -the Ninth Circuit concluded
that the NLRA does not preempt the California statute and determined that 43
the challenged restrictions did not violate the First
Amendment.

First Amendment jurisprudence is not noted for its perspicuity,
and few areas of labor law seem quite as confusing as the scope of
federal preemption." It has been forcefully argued that "the First
Amendment is a charter for government," and "'free trade in ideas'
means free trade in the opportunity to persuade to action, not merely
to describe facts."4 5 Accordingly, on freedom-of-expression grounds,

the Supreme Court has barred state laws that constrain one party's
ability to speak in favor of union organizing. 4' The Court has, however, been reluctant to recapture complete First Amendment protection for all activities that implicate the full range of the labor arena.
Still, if labor-organizing activities are properly understood as lawful
exercises of the First Amendment, 47 it would be anomalous if the First
Amendment did not extend to activities opposing organizing.
However symmetrical and logical this contention may be, the asserted right of employer-recipients to use state funds to oppose orga3
39

Id. at 1080.
Id.

40 Id. at
41 Id. at
42

1100.
1080-82.

Chamberof Commerce, 463 F.3d at 1080 (citing the preamble to CAL. GOV'T CODE

§§ 16645-49 (Deering 2009)).
43 Id.

GoRMAN & FINKIN, supranote 13, at 1078.
45 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945).

46 Id. at 518 (finding a state law that appears to be inconsistent with provisions
of
the NLRA to be invalid because, as applied, it imposed a prior restraint on paid organizers who solicit union membership in Texas).
47 SeeJOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 16.54 (7th
ed. 2004).
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nizing was not viewed sympathetically by the Ninth Circuit. Though
NLRA preemption is vital to the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Chamber of
Commerce and the Supreme Court's subsequent reversal,48 perplexing
questions are aroused by the Court of Appeals's dismissal of the
plaintiffs' freedom-of-expression claims. This is so because the Ninth
Circuit determined that the contested provisions of the statute, which
were directed toward employers, do not infringe the employers'
"right[s] to express whatever view they wish on organizing" because
the provisions are deemed neutral and nonpartisan. 49 This conclusion materializes as a contestable one because neutrality may be impossible in theory and particularly as applied by the Ninth Circuit.
Coextensively, while the Supreme Court has often suggested complainants' First Amendment rights warrant some protection, it has
been reluctant to substantiate such rights energetically. ° The Chamber of Commerce opinion breathes life into this unfortunate pattern.
In addition to examining labor law preemption principles, this
Article will inspect the often contestable conception of neutrality in
light of the existence of scholarship advocating an expansion in state
labor law innovation aimed at reducing employer rights.5 ' The ultimate purpose of such innovation seems clear enough: to increase the
level of unionization in the United States and to restore collective action to its previously ascendant status. 52 It is doubtful that this objective can be seen as a "neutral" one. Instead, this goal is delineated by
the declining importance of labor unions in the United States and
the mounting appeal of paternalistic intrusions into the market.5 4 In
light of this goal, employers confronted with either legislative orjudicial assertions of neutrality should be forgiven for suffering from a
preeminent sense of doom. This impression is often made tangible
via partisan enactments and adjudication. With the advent of postChamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Lockyer, 463 F.3d 1076, 1096-97 (9th
Cir. 2006), rev'd sub nom., Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Brown 128 S. Ct. 2408
48

(2008).
49

50
51
52

Id. at 1096.
Hutchison, supranote 25, at 707-16 (describing this development).
See infra Part II.B.
See JOHN R. COMMONS, THE ECONOMICS OF COLLECTIVE AcTiON 23-35 (1950)

(discussing collective action generally and examining collective bargaining during
the period from 1883 to 1945). To his credit, Professor Secunda's innovative efforts

are motivated by the desire to ensure that workers have a fair opportunity to express
their views about unionization. E-mail from Secunda, supranote 33.
53 See, e.g., J. Hoult Verkerke, Employment Contract Law, in THE
NEw PALGRAVE
DICIIONARYOF ECONOMICS AND LAw, 47, 47 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
See generally Harry G. Hutchison, What Workers Want or What Labor Experts Want
Them to Want?, 26 QUiNNiPIAc L. REv. 799 (2008).
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modern discourse and the possibility that courts have become captive
to progressive rhetoric that is not found within the Constitution, this
Article contends that the Supreme Court should reconsider its reliance on the NLRA as the primary vehicle to vindicate employers'
rights and instead should return to the Constitution itself as a basis
for its defense of what has become increasingly difficult to defend:
the free speech rights of employers and employees within a labormanagement context. This approach is exemplified by recapturing
the Supreme Court's understanding of Virginia Electric & Power as a
basis for relief.5 This case, decided before the NLRA was amended,
added explicit protection of employers' speech. Virginia Electric &
Power stands for the proposition that employer and labor union "attempts to persuade to action with respect to joining or not joining
unions are within the First Amendment's guaranty."5
And, yet, Stanley Fish vitiates such sentiments by arguing that for
modern democratic societies like the United States, "there is no such
thing as free speech." 57 If Fish is correct, protection for any speech,
including employer speech, may be impermanent, and the surging
conflict initiated by labor advocates who seek to restrict employer authority and speech may be beyond resolution. At the end of the day,
it is doubtful that placing employer speech rights on a constitutional
plinth should be a basis for lasting celebration for employers because
clarity in this arena, however desirable and however necessary, is likely to remain evanescent unless society regains a consensus on the
meaning of liberty. Adjudication accompanied by imaginative interpretation may mean that freedom-of-expression cannot rest on a reliable foundation and that employer free speech rights face an uncertain future.
Part II of this Article examines preemption doctrine. Part III
considers the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Chamber of Commerce. Part IV
inspects the Supreme Court's opinion reversing the Ninth Circuit.
Part V supplies analysis that is fortified by a re-examination of the Virginia Electric & Powercase.

NLRB v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537-38 (citing NLRB v. Va. Elec. & Power Co.,
314 U.S. 469 (1941)).
57 See STANLEY FISH, THERE'S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND
IT'S A GOOD
THING, Too 114 (1994).
55
56
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II. FINDING THE LAW OF PREEMPTION

A.

Garmon and Machinists Preemption

When regulating conduct and actions that are linked to organizational activities, the NLRB's "primary concern is to protect the statutory rights of employees, but in doing so it must balance those
rights against the rights of the employer and, to a lesser extent, those
of the union. " 5' Section 8(c) of the NLRA defends employers' freedom-of-expression rights but "the protections afforded to speech by
[this section] of the NLRA are not absolute." 9 Circumstances arise
under which the NLRA's chief interpreter, the NLRB, can circumscribe the employer's free speech right because the NLRB must engage "in a continuing effort to the right of free speech and [statutory
requirements against] interference, restraint, or coercion of employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights."'6 The Board maintains a regulatory role in this arena 6 despite precedent suggesting
that the First Amendment provides an independent ground to protect the right of workers, unions, and employers to persuade employees to join or refrain from joining a union. 62
At issue here is whether states also have a role in balancing or alternatively expanding the rights of employees and diminishing the
right of employers. State regulatory efforts raise the specter of federalism conflicts as well as the possibility of preemption. Professors
McGinnis and Somin show that
federalism is the cornerstone of the Constitution .... The constitutional system of federalism assigns powers to state and federal
government officials not for their own benefit, but for that of the
people. These benefits are many, including the satisfaction of diverse preferences and competition both among the states themselves and between the states and federal government.... Sometimes federalism can be protected by only restricting
the power of
strengthening it.6
state governments, rather than

1 JOHN

E.

HIGGINS, JR., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw: THE BOARD, THE COURTS,

AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT 81 (John E. Higgins, Jr. et al., eds., 5th ed.

2006) (citation omitted); see also Baworowsky, supranote 29, at 1753-59.

59 1 HIGGINS, supra note 58, at 95 (citing NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395

U.S. 575
(1969)).
60 Id. (citation omitted).
61 Id. at 121.
62 See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, at 537-38 (1945).
John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States Rights: A Defense ofjudicial
Review in a FederalSystem, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 89, 89 (2004).
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The dispute that gave rise to a district court and several court of
appeals decisions culminating in the Supreme Court's opinion in
Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Brown" evolved largely during an epoch presided over by the Rehnquist Court. This Court ostensibly "redefin[ed] the balance of power between the national government and the states,"65 and thus "reinvigorated the doctrine of
federalism and restored power to the states. ,6 Still, the Supreme
Court has recently published opinions that
call into question allega67
afoot.
is
revolution
federalism
a
that
tions
Whether the modern Court's federalism decisions represent an
inclination to favor symbolism rather than substance,68 whether federalism is a radical idea or not,6 9 or whether the critics of the modern

Court's new federalism only disapprove of the putative shift toward
federalism when the Court offends their preferences,7 ° "it is clear that
New Deal reformers such as President Roosevelt quickly scrapped
[their] earlier states' right views., 7 This shift, by and large, favored
federal regulation of the labor market. Consistent with this move, the
organizing premises attached to the New Deal and the newlyascendant zeitgeist,7 2 "the national government 'came out as the

See Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408, 2412 (2008)
("The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, after twice affirming the District
Court's judgment granted rehearing en banc and reversed.").
65 Jesse H. Choper &John C. Yoo, The Scope of the Commerce Clause After
Morrison,
25 OKLA. CITYU. L. REV. 843, 844 (2000).
66 Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Bringing the People Back In, 80 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 653, 659
(2005) (reviewing LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM ANDJUDICIAL REVIEW (2004)).
67 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding the power
of Congress to ban the use of marijuana for medical purposes, even in states that permit it).
64

68 See David Fontana, The Current Generations of ConstitutionalLaw,
93 GEO. L.J.
1061, 1068-69 (2005) (reviewing MARK TUSHNET, REVIEW OF THE NEW
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2003)).
]
69 See Carry, supra note 30, at 366 (stating

that "[t he notion of federalism is hardly a radical one").
70 Id. at 367 ("[T]he same political forces that condemn
the constitutional revival
of the federalism doctrine are simultaneously, in separate venues pertaining to separate issues, enthusiastically embracing the principles of federalism.").
71 DAVID B. WALKER, THE REBIRTH OF FEDERALISM: SLOUCHING TOWARD
94 (1995).
For a description of the prevailing religious, philosophical, and political mood
of the country, see Harry G. Hutchison, Work, the Social Question, Progressand the ComWASHINGTON
72

mon Good? 48J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 59 (2009) (reviewing
TRUTHS: CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN LAW

RECOVERING

SELF-EVIDENT

(Michael A. Scaperlanda & Teresa

Stanton Collett eds., 2007).
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more authoritative
partner in the [newly transformed] federal-state
73
system.'

The Supreme Court stated, "As enacted in 1935, the NLRA.
did not include any provision that specifically addressed the intersection between employee organizational rights and employer speech
rights. ' 74 Instead, cabined by the restructured boundaries of Ameri-

ca's liberal-legalist order, it was left to a federal regulatory agency,
"the NLRB, subject to review in federal court to reconcile these [often conflicting] interests in its construction of §§ 7 and 8" of the
NLRA.75 While an "employer's free speech right to communicate his
views to his employees is firmly established and cannot be infringed
by a union or the Board, 76 this teaching does not resolve the question of whether a state can infringe when both the union and the
Board cannot. Turning directly to the federalism issue, it is remarkable that the NLRA, "unlike other federal laws that expressly confront
their relationships to overlapping or potentially conflicting state law,"
generally speaking, fails to contain a statement articulating Congress's intent on this issue in the text of the Act. 77 As more fully de-

veloped below, an exception to this general rule arguably surfaces
with respect to the text of section 8(c) of the NLRA and employer
free speech rights. 8
Despite this exception, "the law of preemption is entirely judgemade and so is subject to shifts in judicial application over time." 79
The NLRA carries implications of exclusive federal authority and reflects Congress's withdrawal from the states of much that had previously rested with them.80 What has been taken from the states and
what has been left to them are to be concretized by the Board under
the supervision of the courts. 81 Initially, federal court intervention in
disputes between states and the federal government regarding state

73

Garry, supra note 30, at 371 (quoting WALKER, supra note 71, at 97).

74

Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408, 2413 (2008).

75

Id.

NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969).
GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 13, at 1079; see also Garner v. Teamsters Union,
346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953) ("The [NLRA] .. .leaves much to the states, though Congress has refrained from telling us how much. We must spell out from conflicting
indications of congressional will the area in which state action is still permissible.").
78 See infra Part III.
79 GORmAN & FINKIN, supra note 13, at 1079.
Id. at 1079, 1080-81 (citing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359
U.S. 236, 244 (1959)).
81 Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzalez, 356 U.S. 617, 619 (1958).
76
77
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attempts
to regulate labor relations were characterized by reluc82
tance.
Arguing for a return to reluctant adjudication that permits states
to engage in legislative innovation promoting collective action in the
workplace,8" Professor Gottesman concedes that judicial opinions
preempting state laws that collide with the collective bargaining regime created by the NLRA, were properly struck down.8 4 However,
the courts "did so through the adoption of preemption rules that...
were overbroad."8 5 Gottesman admits the rule adopted in San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garon, an early preemption case, "made
good sense with respect to the type of conduct challenged in that
case"-picketing, an economic weapon to gain recognition-because
this activity "lies on a continuum which Congress has regulated in its
entirety."8 Conversely, he reasons that Garmon's preemptive reach
should not be deployed-leaving space for state regulation-when
Congress has chosen to regulate categories of conduct in only a limited way. 7 Joined in this view by Professor Secunda, who champions a fundamental re-conceptualization of preemption analysis to
diminish a "too-aggressive application of Machinists,"88 Gottesman in82 Michael H. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption: State Laws Facilitating
Unionization,7 YALEJ. ON REG. 355, 386 (1990).
83 See RIcHARD B. FREEMAN &JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT (2006) (intro-

ducing recent scholarship that favors collective action in the workplace); see also Ellen Dannin, NLRA Values, Labor Values, American Values, 26 BERKLEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L.

223 (2005) (same). But see Hutchison, supra note 54, at 799-819 (questioning the
wisdom of this idea).
Gottesman, supra note 82, at 355-56.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 357 (discussing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S.
236
(1956)).
87 Id. at 358. When referring to Professor Gottesman's proposition, Professor Secunda characterizes this area as a place where the federal law provides some restriction but where the conduct at issue is not on a continuum. Secunda, Toward the Viability of State-Based Legislation, supra note 14, at 213. Professor Gottesman illustrates
what he means by arena wherein NLRA operates in a limited way by referring to the
intersection of employer property rights and union demands for access to employer
property for purposes of organizing. Gottesman, supra note 82, at 358. "In those limited circumstances, an employer who denies access commits an unfair labor practice. However, in most cases, because off-premises communication is available, the
NLRA does not entitle unions to enter employer premises and therefore, an employer does not violate the NLRA by refusing access." Id. (citations omitted). Though
Professor Gottesman does not see that the alteration of labor union access rules by
state access enactments instantiates a change in the labor-management balance of
power, it seems clear that Machinists preemption is clearly implicated. For a discussion of this issue, see DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, LABOR LAw: IN A NUTSHELL, 321-23 (5th ed.

2008).

Secunda, Toward the Viability of State-Based Legislation, supranote 14, at 213.
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sists that overbroad preemption rulemaking persuades federal courts
to preclude state regulatory efforts that are consistent with the political impulses that gave rise to the NLRA. s9 Despite vast and depressing evidence demonstrating that unions-like most cartels °-"raise
wages in ways that misallocate labor and reduce social output,"9 advocates of increased state power as a vehicle for expanding union
power implore courts to reinterpret the preemption doctrine in a
manner that permits states to encourage unionization and prohibit
certain kinds of employer speech. 9
Perhaps influenced by the desire to accelerate "social progress"
created by building a transformative "social movement,""5 but refusing to rely solely on workers' ability to freely choose or reject voluntary forms of human solidarity that may or may not include unions,
some labor experts appear drawn to government power as a vehicle
to ensure organizing. This move is evidently grounded in the contestable presumption that their opinion favoring unionization or
some other kind of labor organization represents the actual desires of
workers.94 Though it is doubtful that this viewpoint reflects the perspective of most Americans or most workers,75 taken as a whole this
perspective coincides with the conclusion that workers and employers' constitutional rights to free speech, including freedom for employer speech, depend less on the Constitution and more on state acGottesman, supranote 82, at 356.
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 343 (7th ed. 2007)
(arguing that the NLRA is a kind of reverse Sherman Act designed to encourage cartelization of labor markets); Lloyd Cohen, Comments on the Legal Education Cartel, 17 J.
OF CONT. L. ISSUES 25, 28 (2008) ("[A]ll cartels raise price and reduce quantity as
compared to what would prevail in a competitive market."); Hutchison, supra note
54, at 813 (arguing that the effectiveness of the labor cartel is now in doubt).
91 Richard Freeman, Is Declining Unionization of the U.S. Good, Bad, or
Irrelevant?, in
UNIONS AND ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS 143, 144 (Lawrence Mishel & Paula B. Voos
eds., 1992).
92 Secunda, Toward the Viability of State-Based Legislation, supranote 14,
at 213 (citing Gottesman, supranote 82).
93 See, e.g., Jim Pope, Next Wave Organizingand the Shift to a New Paradigm
of Labor
Law, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 515, 530-34 (2006).
94 See generally FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 83, at 184 ("That so many
workers
do not have the voice at the workplace that they want bespeaks a remarkable institutional failure in the country's labor laws and labor relations system.").
' See, e.g.,
Sharon Rabin Margalioth, The Significance of Worker Attitudes: Individualism as a Cause for Labor's Decline in Employee Representation, in THE EMERGING
89
90

WORKPLACE: ALTERNATIVES/SUPPLEMENTS TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 41-49 (Samuel

Estreicher ed., 1998) (showing that American workers have been increasingly attracted to expressive individualism, which concentrates on subjective self-realization
and are less likely to find attractive any collective action that requires individual interest to yield to group interest and solidarity).
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tion aimed at diminishing employers' property rights and expanding
union rights. 96 Such efforts may ultimately prove to be short-sighted
because if states have power to police this domain without fear of
preemption or the First Amendment, it is not clear that they will deploy their power to favor the preferences of labor advocates. On the
contrary, states that are unshackled from the reach of preemption
might choose to enact legislation that contracts rather than inflates
the freedom of labor union organizers
and that expands rather than
9 7
restricts the discretion of employers.
Preemption doctrine has given rise to three distinct grounds for
preemption of state regulation." Two grounds are of interest here. 99
The first is often referred to as Garmon preemption. It provides a
"substantive rights" or "primary jurisdiction" basis for precluding any
state law that has the potential of upsetting the uniform scheme of
national labor policy.'tm As discussed more fully below, Garmon-type
preemption can be subdivided into two component parts. 101
The second ground for preemption is often referred to as Machinist-type preemption, under which the NLRA is understood to
create an insulated zone for collective action and collective bargaining that precludes any regulation that would "upset what Congress intended to be the unregulated play of economic force."'0 ° Broadly
speaking, the doctrine of preemption owes much of its force to Garmon and its progeny, and Machinists can be seen to rest on distinctly
different or related doctrinal grounds. This second ground, directed

Secunda, Toward the Viability of State-Based Legislation, supra note 14, at 214. But
see Baworowsky, supra note 29, at 1713-68 (arguing that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments should protect corporate, religious speech from statutory regulation).
97 See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 548-57 (1945) (Roberts,
J., dissenting) (arguing that a Texas state statute restricting paid union organizers' liberty in
the exercise of the state's police power-upheld by the Texas Supreme Courtshould be upheld by the United States Supreme Court); see also Nathan Newman, The
Conflict of the Courts: RICO, Labor, and Legal Preemption in Union Comprehensive Campaigns, 51 DRAKE L. REv. 307, 311 (2003) (discussing a labor union attempt to use
96

NLRA preemption doctrine to block the application of a Louisiana law by an employer).
GOR mAN & FINKIN, supra note 13, at 1079.

Id. (noting that the third preemption ground consists of "the judge-made policy under section 301 of the [NLRA] that favors the resolution of disputes arising under collective bargaining agreements by the contractual machinery established for
that purpose . . . and precludes state administrative agencies and state courts from
supplanting those contractual (and judicially favored) processes").
Id.
1 See infra notes 112-28.
102
GoRMAN & FINKIN, supra note 13, at 1079.
99
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toward maintaining the labor-management balance of power, 0 3 is the
most important for purposes of this Article. Within this domain, the
NLRB declines to take an active role, and states are barred from
doing otherwise. Furthermore, it is 4possible to violate both Machinist
and Garmon preemption doctrines.

Before deploying either preemption prong, courts are often
called upon to consider a crucial question concerning whether a state
program imposing conditions on employment is regulatory and
therefore likely preempted under either Machinists|°5 or Garmon,'06 or

whether the state is acting narrowly to serve its own needs 01 7 in a proprietary capacity as a market participant.0 8 A state statute becomes
regulatory only when it "addresses employer conduct unrelated to the
employer's performance of contractual obligations to the government" entity. |°9
Returning to the first ground, Garmon substantive rights or "primary jurisdiction" preemption advances a doctrine where, crucial to
the administration of the NLRA, the courts insist that the determination of what is actually protected by section 7 or prohibited by section
8 should be left to the NLRB." ° Limited preemption, which has been
the norm in other areas of federal law, merely suspends state action
in order to give the agency time to take action."' The Garmon doctrine, when applicable, means that "in the vast majority of cases where
federal labor preemption is triggered ... the state is deprived of any
supra note 87, at 322.
See, e.g., Employers Ass'n v. United Steelworkers, 32 F.3d 1297 (8th Cir. 1994).
Minnesota's Striker Replacement Law declares it to be an unfair labor practice for
employers to hire permanent replacement employees during a strike. Id. at 1298.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that this deprives employers of the
economic weapon of hiring permanent-replacement workers during an economic
strike. Id. at 1300. The appellate court went on to hold that the state law was
preempted under both the Garmon and Machinists tests. Id. at 1300-01.
105 2 HIGGINS, supranote 58, at 2344.
106 Id. at 2342-44.
103 LESLIE,
104

107 Id. at 2344.

1os See, e.g., Wis. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S.
282 (1986); GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 13, at 1095 ("[W]hen a states acts as a regulator of labor activity the action is subject to preemption analysis; but when the state
acts as [a market participant] ... it is far less likely to be subject to preemption constraints."). But see Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408,
2419-22 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (contending that the regulator/marketparticipant distinction often offered in such cases is a false dichotomy because the
converse of a market-participant is not necessarily "regulator").
109Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep't v. Allbaugh, 295 F.3d 28, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
no GoRMAN & FININ, supranote 13, at 1084.
III

_
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power to act at all."'. In Garmon federal labor preemption found
its
4
fullest expression 1 3 in a Supreme Court rule that prevails today."
In Garmon, the issue was whether a state court interpreting state
law could award damages to an employer who suffered business losses
from a union's peaceful picketing." 5 Finding that the state could not
provide this remedy, Garmon preemption evolved into two constituent
parts."16 The first part safeguards the substantive rights of workers
who are covered by the NLRA. This means that "[a] state cannot
prohibit (or award damages) for conduct that the federal law protects.
The conflict is obvious and the latter controls as a matter of federal
supremacy."" 7 Because of the ever-present danger of conflict, the
Supreme Court maintains that state law is preempted if it regulates
conduct that is protected by section 7.118 The NLRB retains primary
jurisdiction to monitor protected activity. As a general rule, judicial
application of the first component of the Garmon doctrine has not
proved controversial.""6
Less obvious is the second and more controversial proposition:
"that a state cannot also prohibit (or add remedies for) conduct that
the federal law prohibits."'20 The NLRB retains primary jurisdiction to
monitor prohibited activity, and the states cannot deter from what
the NLRA prohibits despite a persistent "strain in Supreme Court
112
113

Id.
Id. at 1079 (citing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236

(1959)).

Gottesman, supra note 82, at 356.
GORMAN &FINKIN, supra note 13, at 1081-82.
116 See id. at 1081.
117 Id. Therefore, the state cannot regulate the character of
those who function as
business agents for labor unions because the declared purpose of the Wagner Act is
to encourage collective bargaining and to protect the full freedom of workers in the
selection of bargaining representatives of their own choice. Id. at 1082 (citing Hill v.
Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945)). Substantive rights arise largely out of section 7 of the
NLRA, which provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities.
114

15

National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2007).
]isAmalgamated Ass'n v. Wis. Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383, 398-99
(1951) ("It would be sufficient to state that the Wisconsin Act, in forbidding peaceful
strikes for higher wages [by workers covered by the NLRA], has forbidden the exercise of rights protected by section 7 of the [NLRA].").
"9 Gottesman, supranote 82, at 377.
12

GORMAN&FINIUN, supra note 13, at 1081.
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opinions, almost uniformly in concurring or dissenting opinions, that
argues for a more limited form of preemption, one that only bars
states from inhibiting conduct that the federal Act actually protects."' 121 Rejecting this constrained view, Garmon prevents states from
adding penalties to or otherwise regulating unfair labor practices
within the meaning of the NLRA.122 Evidently, preemption is required to defend the primacy and uniformity of NLRB adjudication
from erosion. Parties that violate the NLRA remain under the primary jurisdiction (administration) of the Board based on the judgment
that administration is more than a means of regulation; it is regulation. 12 To be sure, administration is unlikely to resemble something
noble or beautiful in an Aristotelian sense 2 4 because the NLRA,
through its enforcement mechanism, relies on highly technical arguments 25 that reaffirm Justice Frankfurter's observation that administration 26devolves into a hyper-specialized "process of litigating elucidation."1

A second basis for preemption, in which the NLRA is understood to create an insulated zone for collective action and collective
bargaining, precludes regulation that would upset an arena that
Congress intended to be left unregulated (other than by the parties'
economic weapons) and has been labeled Machinists preemption.
Thus understood, Machinists preemption means that "[a] n economic
weapon that is neither arguably protected nor arguably prohibited

121

Id.

122 Id.
123

Id. at 1084 (citing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236

(1959)).
124

See, e.g., Joe Sachs, Introduction to

ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS xi, xxi

(2002) (describing Aristotle's conception of "beautiful" and illustrating his conception via two metaphors: Aristotle might say that "an action is right in the same way
that a painting might get everything right," or alternatively, he might refer to Antigone who contemplates in her imagination the act of burying her brother and says
"it would be a beautiful thing to die doing this") (internal citation omitted).
125 Harry C. Hutchison, Toward a Robust Conception of "IndependentJudgment":
Back
to the Future?, 36 U.S.F. L. REv. 335, 339 (2002).
1
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzalez, 356 U.S. 617, 619 (1957). The Supreme

Court has considered a plethora of preemption cases. See, e.g., RONALD D. ROTUNDA
& JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE

275-79 (4th ed. 2007) (finding more than thirty such cases). Garmon preemption
has produced an impressive range of cases. See, e.g., Wis. Dep't of Indus., Labor and
Human Relations v.Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282 (1986) (preempting the state's use of
its spending power to debar certain repeat violators from doing business with the
state); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985) (rejecting preemption and allowing the state to set forth minimum health standards for covered residents of the state).
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nonetheless may be immune from state regulation. " 127 Evidently,
Congress envisioned that employer and union conduct in some situations would be entirely free from legal regulation. 2 1 Conduct that
falls within this domain is sheltered by Machinists preemption. Because state and Board regulation might alter the federally approved
labor-management balance of weapons within this insulated sphere of
activity,'29 the Machinists' doctrine teaches us that the NLRB and the
states are without power to regulate or otherwise protect activity within this arena.130
In Machinists, a state labor relations board ordered the cessation
of a concerted refusal to work overtime as a means of putting bargaining pressure on an employer.13 ' Because the union's action was
not protected by the NLRA, the employer could discharge the em-

127

LESLIE, supra note 87, at 320. The Morton case bridges the gap between the

Garmon and Machinists prongs of preemption analysis. In Morton, the Supreme Court
held that the issue was whether Congress had so completely occupied this field as to
close it to regulation by the states. Local 20, Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U.S.
252 (1964). Concluding that peaceful appeals to secondary employers constitute an
economic weapon intended to be left to the marketplace, and that such appeals were
permitted but not protected by federal law, the Court held that the state could not
outlaw this self-help weapon because this would alter the intended balance of power
between labor and management. Id. at 259-60. The Court stated, "[b]ut even
though it may be assumed that at least some of the secondary activity here involved
was neither protected nor prohibited, it is still necessary to determine whether by
enacting § 303, 'Congress occupied this field and closed it to state regulation.'" Id. at
258 (citing Int'l Union of United Auto. Workers v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454, 457
(1950)). The Court further explained that "[t]he basic question is whether 'in a case
such as this, incompatible doctrines of local law must give way to principles of federal
labor law.'" Id. (citing Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102
(1962)). Finally, the Court stated that "[t]he answer to that question ultimately depends upon whether the application of state law in this kind of case would operate to
frustrate the purpose of the federal legislation." Id. (citing Colo. Anti-Discrimination
Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714, 722 (1963)).
12 LESLIE, supra note 87,
at 322.
129 Id.
130 Activity within this insulated zone has not been
always free from state regulation. See, e.g., GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 13, at 1103 (citing Auto. Workers v. Wis.
Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949)):
In Briggs-Stratton, the union had called for a series of intermittent work
stoppages to put bargaining pressure on the employer, and the employer secured an order against that activity from a state board under
state law .... [In this specific case,] [tihe union's conduct was neither
prohibited nor protected by the NLRA. The Court saw "no basis" to
deny the state power "to regulate a course of conduct that is neither
made a right under federal law nor a violation of it."
Id.
,31GoRMAN & FINKIN, supra note 13, at 1104 (citing Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 135 (1976)).
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ployees for using the contested tactic. 32 Neither the NLRB nor the
state could have intervened to deny the union the use of the disputed
device 33 because Congress "meant to leave some activities altogether
unregulated-and to be controlled by the free play of economic
forces." 13 4 According to the two Justices of the Machinists Court necessary to make up a majority, "[s] tate laws should not be regarded as
neutral if they reflect an accommodation of the special interests of
employers, unions, or the public in areas such as employee selforganization, labor disputes, or collective bargaining.' ' 35 In other
words, within the zone insulated from regulation, states cannot take
sides and seek to implement their own view of the permissible use of
economic weapons. The Machinists' theory of preemption has been
applied to challenge legislation concerning the recruitment of replacements for strikers as well as legislation bearing upon the obligations of successor employers toward workers of predecessor firms.3 6
In general, where state law sets a floor providing employment rights
for all, it is not preempted. However, where the state adopts legislation directed toward collective bargaining 7 or creates a distinction
between unionized and non-unionized employees in enforcing the
state law, 3 1 it is preempted.
B. DiminishingMachinists: Neutrality as a PropertyRights Gambit?
Recently, the Machinists doctrine has come under sustained attack by proponents of employer neutrality. One proposal would diminish Machinists' preclusive effect by encouraging the following:
[states should] provide for minimum conditions in the workplace
under its police power or place property restrictions on the bundle of property rights that the state grants to its property ownersthat is, the bundle of property rights that private property owners
possess would not include the use of their property for labor [and
other] ...purposes.139
This forcefully argued effort to restrict employer speech, grounded in
an expansive conception of "neutrality," correlates with a thesisId.
Id. (citing Machinists, 427 U.S. at 143).
14 Id. (citing Machinists,
427 U.S. at 144).
1 LESLIE, supra note 87, at 322 (quoting Machinists, 427 U.S. at 156 n.*).
132
133

1

GORMAN& FINKIN, supranote 13, at 1104.

Id. at 1105-08.
1108-09 (citing Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994) (explaining the
preemptive effect of section 301 of the NLRA)).
17

138Id. at

Secunda, Toward the Viability of State-Based Legislation, supra note 14, at 212 (advocating ways to weaken the preclusive effect of Machinists).
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employer coercion as an obstacle to representation-that undergirds
the enactment of the disputed statute, AB 1889, that gave rise to the
Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Brown decision. Consistent with this
thesis but inconsistent with the statute's asserted defense ensuring
state neutrality, AB 1889 exempts from the statute's restrictions employer-recipient expenditures connected (1) to giving a union access
to the employer's property (workplace), and (2) to voluntarily
recog40
nizing a union as the bargaining representative of employees.
While the statute can be exposed as an under-theorized enactment, it operates as a prototype and forecasts future efforts within the
labor-management arena. Academic commentators have offered analogous proposals designed to contract property's scope,14 1 and such
proposals
often attempt to limit the free speech rights of employ142
ers, increase the access rights of labor unions enabling them to expand the level of worker self-organization,' 43 and transform labor's
moribund state through increased grass roots organizing and
through the use of the Internet. 144 Properly appreciated, many of
these proposals are designed to neutralize employer opposition to social transformation made concrete through increased employee participation in workplace decision making and increased dues revenue
45
collection used to pursue social transformation through politics. 1

In order to facilitate these objectives, states are urged to adopt
their own labor policy and to vitiate employer's property interests
140

Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408, 2411 (2008); see
16647 (Deering 2009).
For an excellent critique of this move, see Eric Claeys, Property 101: Is Property a

CAL GOv'T CODE §
141

Thing or a Bundle?, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 617, 647 (2009) (reviewing THOMAS W.
E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (2007) (arguing that
property is more than the right to exclude, it is a right to exclusively determine the
use of something).
142 An example of such proposals is the New Jersey
Workers Freedom from Employer Intimidation Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:19-9 to -14 (West 2007).
'43 See, e.g., Feinstein, supranote 4, at 346-49
(discussing in general terms how unions have become more active in promoting innovative changes in state, county, and
municipal laws that encourage union growth, but conceding that the doctrine of
preemption may limit such efforts).
M Charles B. Craver, The Labor Movement Needs a Twenty-First Century Committee for
IndustrialOrganization,23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. LJ. 69, 69, 87-97 (2005).
MERRILL & HENRY

145 See, e.g., Harry C. Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest:
Infusing the Labor Union
Dues Dispute with First Amendment Values, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1309, 1380-81
(2006) (arguing that organizing, particularly extra-bargaining unit organizing, is not
necessarily aimed at expanding economic benefits for workers but rather aimed at
social transformation.). This effort is supported by "evidence indicating that unions
tend to consume up to 80 percent of union dues on . . . political, ideological, and
other challengeable expenditures that are unlikely to have a representational objective." Id. at 1381.
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based on the conclusion that property, whatever it is, consists of a
contestable bundle of rights. Hence, withdrawing a stick-the employer's exclusive possessory interest in its property-is legitimized by
lionizing an iatrogenic goal. 4 " This "disintegrated" conception of
property implies that property is not a thing but a highly-contingent
arrangement of distinct elements serving socio-political goals'47 that
purportedly fulfill human values. 4" Hence, on one account, employer's "property rights materialize as a supernatural entity or as a form
4
On this view, property owners must
of transcendental nonsense.""'
expect to find the absoluteness of their property rights curtailed by
the organs of society for the promotion of the best interests of
others' 50 who have little or no permanent stake in the preservation of
the economic value of the property in question. As such, the right to
exclude can be diminished unless property owners can demonstrate
146 The

iatrogenic possibility emerges out of the modem process of incessant diagnosis and treatment that problematizes human life. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER
SHANNON, CONSPICUOUS CRITICISM: TRADITION, THE INDIVIDUAL, AND CULTURE IN

MODERN AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT 199-201 (2006). Ignoring rent-seeking efforts
(the competition for government favors) by unions and union hierarchs for themselves and their political allies, whimsy can be found when commentators, legislators,
and judges insist on the value of compulsory unionization when the survey evidence
and the actual behavior of workers shows that it is improbable that even a significant
minority of private-sector workers share the conviction that conventional unions are
the best vehicles for the advancement of the full gamut of their interest. Samuel Estreicher, The Dunlop Report and the Future of Labor Law Reform, 12 LAB. LAW 117, 118
n.2 (1996); see alsoJeffrey M. Hirsch & Barry T. Hirsch, The Rise and Fall of PrivateSector Unionism: What Next for the NLRA?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1133, 1139-40 (2007)
("Absent a sharp and unlikely shift by workers and voters from individualistic to collectivist attitudes or a more broad shift in U.S. economic policy from a competitive to
a corporatist orientation, a resurgence in traditional private sector unionism is unlikely."). Compulsory unionization, of course, means involuntary unionization.
"[C]ollective bargaining imposed by statute appears to be consistent with the notion
that legislation tends to favor a centralized decision-making process, [meaning that]
interest groups (and/or interest group leaders) try[] to impose their will at the expense of more diffuse (and more diverse groups) and subgroups." Hutchison, supra
note 145, at 1377 (quotations omitted). If interest uniformity does not arise naturally, it remains highly doubtful that collective bargaining decisions initiated by union
hierarchs will produce a collectively-rational outcome that represents, let alone benefits, the majority or even a minority of workers. See generally id. at 1376-77.
147 Adam Mossoff, What is Property?Putting the Pieces Back Together,
45 ARIz. L. REV.
371, 373-77 (rejecting the disintegrated theory of property and offering instead an
integrated theory of property that maintains that the right to exclude, while fundamental to a principled conception of property rights, is insufficient and must include
an understanding and defense of other elements such as exclusive acquisition, use,
and disposal).
W State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971) (citing 5 RICHARD POWELL, REAL
PROPERTY§ 746 (1970)).
149 But see Mossoff, supra note 147, at 373.
150 Shack, 277 A.2d at 373 (quoting 5 POWELL, supra note 148, at § 745).
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good reasons for preventing access by union organizers"' or a constitutionally-adequate ground for legitimizing and protecting employer
speech rights. Based on this view, it is possible to infer that employer
claims to possession and exclusive use of their facilities, including the
right to exclude and the right to engage in non-coercive speech regarding union organizing campaigns, face a premature and unwarranted demise. 152 Labor advocates and labor hierarchs, who appear
to have embraced a conception of property that has succumbed to
the acid wash of nominalism first popularized in the law by the legal
realists, 153 champion this development. If extended to weaken Machinists and other preemption doctrines, and if reified by the Supreme Court, this approach might preclude future efforts by the federal judiciary to invalidate innovative state labor regulation that has
been offered under the sheltering umbrella provided by allegations
of neutrality. Placing political liberty at risk,154 this constrained notion of property concludes that it contains nothing essential for the
state to protect and, accordingly, preemption doctrine as a device to
constitutionalize the protection of employer speech can be eviscerated by inventing a few phrases. Though such developments cannot
be seen as neutral, they may be facilitated by the adoption of postmodern discourse, which can deprive courts of the language neces55
sary to reclaim rights and freedom within any contestable context1
and "return us to Alasdair McIntyre's perplexing15 dilemma wherein
human history provides no sound basis for rights." 1
Taken together, this development may suggest that employer
speech rights are little more than an empty suit, and it underscores
Isaiah Berlin's claim that the pursuit of "positive" liberty on behalf of
other people is necessarily incompatible with the commitment to
permit people to live their own lives free from interference from others, particularly interference from political authorities. 157 This effort
to discount employer property rights elevates doubts concerning
whether preemption doctrine is adequate to the task of defending
See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 34, at 309 (arguing that employers' property rights
ought to be restricted sharply in the context of an organizing campaign in order to
improve access by non-employee union organizers to the employer's plant or land).
52 Mossoff, supra note 147, at 375.
151

153
154

Id. at 371-72.
Id. at 374.

155

Hutchison, supra note 25, at 706.
Id.
Amy Gutmann, How Limited is Liberal Government?, in LIBERALISM WrTHOUT

156
157

ILLUSIONS: ESSAYS ON LIBERAL THEORY AND THE POLICAL VISION OFJUDrrH N. SHKLAR

64, 69 (Bernard Yack ed., 1996) (disagreeing with Isaiah Berlin).
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employers' freedom-of-expression claims. Still, it remains possible
that a robust conception of the First Amendment, energetically enforced, may hinder state efforts to abrade employers' free speech
rights. 158
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT TAKES A STAND

A.

Prolegomena

The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Chamber of Commerce responded to
the district court's decision upholding the plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment. 15 9 Plaintiffs filed various claims for "declaratory
and injunctive relief regarding [the] enforcement of California Assembly Bill 1889 (ABA 1889), [which added] California Government
code § 16645 and following."60 Briefly stated, AB 1889 "prohibits the
use of state funds or property to assist, promote, or deter union organizing; allows remedies for such violations; and requires state fund
recipients to maintain sufficient records to show state funds were not
improperly used under AB 1889. "16' The plaintiffs filed "a Motion for
Summary Judgment arguing AB 1889 is unconstitutional under the
federal and California Constitutions and preempted by the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), and the Medicare Act. 16 2 Finding that a series
of preliminary issues
did not bar relief, the district court decided the
63
issue.
preemption

Emphasizing that NLRA section 8(c) dictates that the statement
"of any views, argument, or opinion.., shall not constitute or be evi-

158

See Hutchison, supra note 25, at 716 (discussing this possibility); see also Bawa-

rowsky, supra note 29, at 1753-59 (energetically favoring First Amendment protection for corporate employers). But see NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 615
(1969) (employer's First Amendment claims were not sufficient to overturn NLRB
finding of an unfair labor practice where an employer made statements that could be
deemed a threat of retaliation); Archibald Cox, Foreword: Freedom of Expression in the
Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1, 36-37 (1980) (commenting on the failure of the
First Amendment to rescue a union's effort to engage in secondary picketing from
thepreclusive reach of the NLRB).

T Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Lockyer, 225 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1206
(C.D. Cal. 2002), afj'd, 364 F.3d 1154, rev'd sub nom., Chamber of Commerce of the
U.S. v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408 (2008).
16
161
162
165

Id. at 1201.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1201-04 (discussing the Eleventh Amendment, standing, and abstention,

and finding that such contentions do not bar relief under the preemption doctrine
implicated by the application of the NLRA).
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dence, of an unfair labor practice.., if such expression contains no
threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit," ' 4 the district court
found that this provision manifests "congressional intent to encourage free debate on issues dividing labor and management." ' 5 By contrast, the California statute prohibits "attempts by the employer to influence employee decisions through speech" while the "employer "is
being compensated with state funds or while ... on state property.
Thus, the statute restricts employer speech about union organizing
under a specified circumstance, even though Congress intended to
encourage unregulated debate.1 17 On one account, AB 1889 is a
"state labor regulation that has only one purpose and effect: to halt
the free flow of non-coercive information from employer to their
employees, so that unions may take advantage of the enforced silence
As such,
and corral uninformed employees into unionization. '
employees are arguably the real victims of this effort to undo federal
labor policy."6 The district court found that AB 1889, if allowed to
stand, would prevent free debate '70 and dismissed the defendants'
and interveners' contention that "Machinist [sic] is inapplicable ...
because the state is merely controlling the use of state funds and is
acting in its proprietary capacity." 7' Finding that the California statute is regulatory and that the challenged restrictions prevent what
Congress intended, the district court, subject to a few exceptions,
granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.7 7 The validity of
this decision proved to be short-lived.
B.

The Ninth Circuit and Employer Free Speech Claims

Over the past twenty-five years, labor hierarchs, labor organizations, and their ideological allies appear to have obtained a sympathetic hearing before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 73 Nowhere
ICA

1
66
167
168

Id. at 1204 (quoting NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2000)).
Chamberof Commerce, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1204.
Id. at 1204-05.
Id. at 1205.
Brief of the Nat'l Right to Work Legal Def. Found. et al. as Amici Curiae Sup-

porting Petitioners, Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408
(2008) (No. 06-939).
169 Id.
170 Chamber of Commerce, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1205.
171 Id.

Id. at 1206 (excepting CAL. Gov.CODE §§ 16645.1, .3, .4, .6).
See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. NLRB,
769 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (holding that extra-bargaining unit
penditures are germane to collective bargaining and chargeable to
dues over their objections, despite the Supreme Court holding in
172

173
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is this sympathy clearer than in the court's decision upholding provisions of AB 1889 that restrict employers who receive state grants or
funds from using those funds to assist, promote, or deter union organizing."' Deciding that California's grant and program fund restrictions do not fall within the market participant exception, 7 ' are not
preempted by the NLRA,"7 ' and do not violate the First Amendment,' the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, 7 ' after twice declining to do so.""
California enacted ABA 1889 to add sections 16645 through
16649 to the California Government Code. ABA 1889 contained the
following statement:
It is the policy of the state not to interfere with an employee's
choice about whether to join or to be represented by a labor union. For this reason, the state should not subsidize efforts by an
employer to assist, promote, or deter union organizing. It is the
intent of the Legislature in enacting this act to prohibit an employer from using state funds and facilities for the purpose of influencing employees to support or oppose unionization and to
prohibit an employer from seeking to influence employees to

Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 762-63 (1988), that only those fees and dues that are
necessary to the collective bargaining could be exacted); Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline
& S.S. Clerks, 685 F.2d 1065, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 1982), (holding that union organizing expenditures were chargeable to union dissenters because each of the challenged expenditures were germane to the collective bargaining work of the union),
rev'd, 466 U.S. 435, 451-53, 457 (1984). But see Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
427 F.2d 996, 999-1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1970) (reversing the district court's decision
that jurisdiction was preempted by the NLRA by concluding that section 301 of the
Labor-Management Relations Act conferred jurisdiction upon the district court),
rev'd, 553 F.2d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 1976) (finding against the labor union and holding that the lower court erred by not granting employees a full hearing on whether
the intra-union remedy was fair and adequate).
174 Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Lockyer, 463 F.3d 1076
(9th Cir. 2006),
rev'd sub nom., Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Brown, 128 S.Ct. 2408; see also
United Food & Commercial Workers, 307 F.3d at 776 (finding union organizing expenditures germane and therefore chargeable to union dues objectors because "union organizing conducted for the general purpose of strengthening the union, while not
germane under the Railway Labor Act, is not explicitly precluded by either the language of the NLRA or the Supreme Court in Beck."). But see Hutchison, supra note
145, at 1364-94 (disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit's assessment in Chamber of Commerce and United Food & Commercial Workers).
175 Chamber of Commerce, 463 F.3d
at 1084.
176 Id. at 1090, 1096.
177 Id.

at 1096.

Id. at 1098.
1
See Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Lockyer, 364 F.3d 1154, 1163-65 (9th
Cir. 2004) (holding AB 1889, as written, is preempted by the NLRA), ajd, 422 F.3d
973 (9th Cir. 2005), vacated, 435 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2006).
178
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support or oppose unionization while those employees are performing work on a state contract.180
The Ninth Circuit described ABA 1889 in its Chamber of Commerce opinion as follows:
Two provisions of the California statute, sections 16645.2 and
16645.7, are at issue on appeal. Section 16645.2(a) bars private
employers who are "recipient[s] of a grant of state funds" from
"us[ing] the funds to "assist, promote, or deter union organizing."
Section 16645.7(a) bars "[a] private employer receiving state
funds in excess of [$10,000] in any calendar year on account of its
participation in a state program" from using program funds to
"assist, promote, or deter union organizing.
The two provisions purport to preclude an employer-recipient from
"'attempting ... to influence the decisions of its employees ... regarding... [w] hether to support or oppose a labor organization that
represents or seeks to represent those employees.,"' 18
Though the
statute is defended on grounds of neutrality, 183 this neutrality is
placed in doubt by virtue of the fact that employer activities are exempted from the reach of the statute if and when the employer vo84
luntarily recognizes a union as the representative of its employees.
In addition to this exemption, the statute places affirmative compliance burdens on employers because the pertinent provisions of AB
1889 require employers to certify "that none of the [state] funds will
be used to assist, promote, or deter union organizing." 8 5 An employer who in fact expends funds "to assist, promote, or deter union organizing shall maintain [and provide upon request] records sufficient
to show that state funds have not been used for those expenditures." 6 The statute presumes that "if an employer commingles state
and other funds ... any expenditures to assist,8 promote,
or deter un7
ion organizing derive in part from state funds."
Consistent with the judgment that the statute's overall scheme is

calibrated to induce recipients of state funds to forego active opposition to a union organizing campaign, the statute imposes severe penalties. The statute states, "Employers who violate sections 16645.2 or
Assemb. B. 1889, 1999-2000 Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000).
Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Lockyer, 463 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir.
2006) rev'd sub nom., Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408.
180

18,

182
183
184
185
186
187

Id.

Id. 1085, 1087.
See CAL. Gov'TCODE § 16647(d) (Deering 2009).
Id. § 16445.2(c); see also id. §16645.7(b).
Id. § 16646(b).
Chamberof Commerce, 463 F.3d at 1081 (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE § 16646(b)).
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16645.7 are subject to fines and penalties, which include the disgorgement of the state funds used for the prohibited purposes and a
civil penalty paid to the state that is equal to twice the amount of
those funds."188 The statute's objective seems clear enough. It signifies a legislative response to the hypothesis that has been transformed
into an idie fixe. employer coercion is the primary factor preventing
workers from exercising their undisclosed choice to join a union. 189
Analytically, the Ninth Circuit correctly maintains that by enacting the challenged legislation, the State of California is not acting as a
market participant. In other words, the statute addresses employer
conduct unrelated to the safe-harbor, which is directed towards preventing preemption that is instantiated when the legislature addresses
private employers' performance of contractual obligations to the
government entity. 19° The court properly insists that the "cases teach
that when a state uses its spending power in a manner that is not essentially proprietary, the market participant exception will not apply
and the state action may be subject to NLRA preemption.""'' Because
the contested provisions of AB 1889 do not "have a narrow scope or
other element indicating that the statute is unrelated to broader regulation," "' the provisions are regulatory and thus may be preempted

188
189

Id. (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 16645.2(d), 16645.7(d)).
The literature predicated on the employer coercion thesis as the prime impe-

diment to unionization is vast. For an excellent introduction to this literature, see
Bodie, supra note 11, at 31-34, which discusses two scholars' views on increased employer coercion and notes that "weak remedies for unfair employer labor practices
combined with lengthy delays in the representation and remediation process encouraged an atmosphere of employer coercion and law breaking." Id. See Brudney,
supra note 21, at 819 (asserting that the NLRB election process is no longer justified
as a normative process because "it regularly tolerates, encourages, and effectively
promotes coercive conditions that preclude the attainment of employee free
choice"). For an excellent refutation of the employer coercion thesis, see Keith H.
Hylton, Law and the Future of OrganizedLabor in America, 49 WAYNE L. REV. 685, 695-97
(2003), which shows that rational employers will only invest in anti-union activities
when having a union would put these employers at a competitive disadvantage with
nonunion employers and also showing that union win-rates in the private sector have
remained consistent at the 50% level since the 1970s. Id. See Kenneth McLennan,
What Do Unions Do? A Management Perspective, in WHAT Do UNIONS Do? A TWENY-YEAR
PERSPECriw 563, 580-82 (James T. Bennett & Bruce E. Kaufman eds., 2007) (questioning the claim that anti-union activities of employers are the primary explanation
for the decline in unionism).
190 See supraPart II.A (discussing Garmon preemption).
191 Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Lockyer, 463
F.3d 1076, 1084 (9th Cir.
2006), rev'd sub nom., Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408
(2008).
'92 Id. at 1084.
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by the NLRA. ' That the challenged provisions are regulatory, how19 4
ever, does not necessarily mean they are preempted by the NLRA.
The Ninth Circuit's preemption analysis "begins with the 'basic
01 5
assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law.""
Accepting the proposition that preemption is a "question of congressional intent and the 'purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone' of preemption analysis,""" the court concedes that "the Supreme Court has articulated two distinct NLRA preemption
doctrines: Machinists preemption and Garmon preemption." 1 7 Considering Machinists preemption first, the court admits that this doctrine
preempts "any state regulation of activity that, although not directly
regulated by the NLRA, was intended by Congress 'to be controlled
by the free play of economic forces."" 8 Insisting that context matters, the Ninth Circuit determines that the "[fJederal courts of appeals have applied Machinists preemption in the context of collective
bargainingbetween organized labor and employers, [but] not in the
context of organizing." 00 Reasoning that collective bargaining constitutes an arena that the NLRA has affirmatively left unregulated,"'0 the
Ninth Circuit offers an additional predicate:
We need not resolve whether Machinists extends to pre-empting a
state action that potentially affects organizing, because even if it
did, AB 1889 would not be preempted under the Machinists doctrine. In enacting a restriction on the use of state grant and program funds with the purpose of remaining neutral in labor disputes, California has not intruded on conduct meant to be left to
the free play of economic forces, an area free from all governmental regulation. Indeed, it is implausible that Congress intended the use of such funds to be an area unregulated because
left to be controlled by the free play of economic forces, when the

19 Id. at 1085.
194 Id.; see also infra Part IV.D (discussing Justice Breyer's agreement with this

view).
195

Chamberof Commerce, 463 F.3d at 1085 (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S.

725, 746 (1981)).
196

Id. (quoting Alameda Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Oakland, 95 F.3d 1406, 1413

(9th Cir. 1996)).
197 Id. (citations
omitted).
198 Id. (quoting Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists
v. Wis. Employment Relations
Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 140 (1976)).
1
Id. at 1086 (emphasis added).
2W Id. (reading the relevant precedents to suggest
that Machinists doctrine concentrates solely on precluding state regulation of the "economic weapons" that Congress intended to give to parties to enable them to reach a collective bargaining
agreement).
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state's choices of how to spend its funds are by definition not controlled by the free play of economic forces.
Because organizing already is regulated to some extent, removing this
activity is not one that Congress left open to be decided by "the free
play of economic forces. 0 12 Therefore, the court of appeals declined
to find AB 1889 preempted.0 3
This move ignores Machinists' admonition that a statute cannot
"be regarded as neutral 'if [it] reflect[s] an accommodation of the
special interests of employers (or] unions." 4 The court of appeals
determined that states have enacted a "neutral hands-off" policy preference, which is situated within an area that is already subject to state
and federal regulation. 23 The statute is neutral because its "restrictions on the use of grant and program funds do not interfere with an
employer's ability to engage in 'self-help' in the sense protected by
Machinists," Gould or Golden State.20 ' Despite the California statute's
purported allegiance to neutrality, the Ninth Circuit fails to notice
that AB 1889 expressly exempts from its restrictive reach any employer activities performed or expenses incurred in connection with undertakings that promote unionization , 20 while correspondingly imposing punitive penalties for employer-recipient error in the use of
state funds.
Though the state's commitment to neutrality is dubious, the
Ninth Circuit reasons that because AB 1889 applies to organizing, an
activity positioned outside of a zone intended to be left free from
regulation, federal courts will not find a statute like AB 1889
Chamber of Commerce, 463 F.3d at 1087 (quotations omitted).
Id. at 1087, 1089. The court of appeals also cites the Supreme Court's Golden
State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 110-11 (1997), decision for the
proposition that Machinists indicated that Congress intended collective bargaining
agreements to be controlled by economic forces-not governmental interference.
Chamberof Commerce, 463 F.3d at 1086.
203 Chamber of Commerce, 463 F.3d
at 1090.
204
LESLIE, supra note 87, at 322 (citing Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wis.
Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 156 n.* (1976)).
5 Chamber of Commerce, 463 F.3d at 1085, 1090. Federal regulation withih an organizing context takes many forms including the following: (1) the NLRB's bar
against "employers and unions alike from making election speeches on company
time to massed assemblies of employees within (twenty-four] hours of an election";
(2) the NLRB's power to regulate speech "that is prejudicial to a fair election"; and
(3) the NLRB's ability to set aside elections under certain circumstances. Id. at 1089.
206 Id. at 1087.
207 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 16647(b), (d) (Deering 2008) (exempting
employer undertakings that allow union representatives access to the employer's property or expenses incurred in "[n]egotiating, entering into, or carrying out a voluntary recognition agreement with a labor organization" from funds restrictions).
201
202
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preempted. °8 Thus scrutinized, the Machinists' doctrine does not
apply to the statute. "Under AB 1889, an employer has and retains
the freedom to spend its own funds however it wishes; it simply may
not spend state grant and program funds on its union-related advocacy. '' 209 Conceding that the state is not free to "require... employer
neutrality as a condition of receiving state funds" because that limits
the firm's ability to use its own money, the court rejects the NLRB's
position claiming the statute is preempted because it "works at cross
purposes with [NLRB] policy. 2 10 In summary, the court insists that
because employers are free to raise and use non-state funds in order
to convey their views about unionization, and because "[i] t is well established that a legislature may attach 'reasonable and unambiguous'
conditions to funds that a recipient is not obligated to accept, ''

1

em-

ployers are "thus free to exercise their First Amendment rights, provided ... they do not use state... funds to [convey their unionizing
views] .212 The court's grasp of liberty and neutrality is questionable,

but its approach is compatible with the conclusion that liberalism, as
the customary governance theory in democratic societies, increasingly
requires the government to take sides without necessarily admitting
it.

The Ninth Circuit maintains that organizing is already subject to
regulation and consequently the disputed statute cannot be barred by
the Machinists prong of the preemption doctrine. This maneuver
does not end the preemption inquiry. On the contrary, the possibilities associated with Garmon preemption are unleashed by the court's
analysis: "Garmon preemption arises when there is an actual or potential conflict between state regulation and federal labor law due to
state regulation of activity that is actually or arguably protected or
prohibited by the NLRA. 21 1 Surrendering to the impression that organizing is already subject to regulation directly raises the possibility
of conflict. 214 However, the Ninth Circuit manages to circumvent this

conflict by following the Supreme Court in asserting that Garmon
208

Chamberof Commerce, 463 F.3d at 1087, 1089.

209 Id. at 1088.

Id. (rejecting the NLRB's contention that California's statute should be invalidated "because it limits the flow of information to employees by regulating employer
speech in an area-an organization election-that Congress did intend to be controlled by the free play of economics forces").
2
Id. (citing Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547
U.S. 47, 70 (2006)).
212 Id. at 1088.
213 Id. at 1090.
214 See Chamber of Commerce, 463 F.3d at 1090.
210
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preemption "does not support an approach which sweeps away statecourt jurisdiction over conduct traditionally subject to state regulation without careful consideration of the relative impact of such ajurisdictional bar on the various interests affected.",2'5 The court explains its position by stating:
California's refusal to subsidize employer speech for or against
unionization does not regulate an activity that is actually pro-

tected or actually prohibited by the NLRA. It does not interfere
with, much less govern, "the same partisan employer speech that
Congress committed to the jurisdiction of the NLRB. Nor does it
infringe employers" First Amendment rights, because employers
remain free to use their own funds to advocate for or against unionization and are not required to accept neutrality as a condition
for the receipt of state grant and program funds.2" 6
This blueprint recalls Professor Gottesman's analysis urging federal
courts to become reluctant to preempt state law where Congress has

chosen to regulate categories of conduct in a limited way.217 Following Gottesman, if employer speech is without protection at all, then, despite the fact that certain kinds of speech are prohibited by the
NLRA, states are free to regulate employer speech in this area.218
This is because Congress has not fully occupied this area but, rather,
regulates this activity in only a limited way.21 9 If this syllogism is accepted, then presumably by analogy, NLRB-enforced limitations on
union access to employer premises during organizing campaigns
ought to give way to state regulation.2 2 0 This is so because the state
regulation fails to jeopardize a cognizable federal interest because
union access to employer premises is an area that lies outside of what

Gottesman describes as the "protected-prohibited continuum," which
would be monitored by robust NLRB oversight. 22 ' Accepting the implications of this paradigm, the Ninth Circuit argues that unless an
exception applies Garmon preempts state regulation "of employee activities that are actually protected under section 7, or activities of either employers or labor unions that are actually prohibited under

215
Id. (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 188 (1978)).

216
217
218

219

Id. at 1092 (citations omitted).
Gottesman, supranote 82, at 358.
See id. at 359-60, 411.

See id. at 357-59, 411 (focusing on Garmon preemption).

220

Seeid. at 411-12.

21

See id. at404, 411.
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It discounts the protective force of section 8(c) of the

NLRA that "prohibits sanctioning employers under the NLRA for engaging in an unfair labor practice when they exercise speech rights
that are guaranteed by the First Amendment. 223 This is so because
the court intuits that prohibition does not constitute a grant of employer speech rights. 4 Instead of sheltering employers' speech
rights, section 8(c) prohibits employers' "noncoercive speech from
being used as evidence of an unfair labor practice. 2 2 Section 8(c)
does not describe activities that are protected by the NLRA, but activities that are protected from the NLRA.2 6
Under the Ninth Circuit's approach, neither Machinists nor
Garmon bar AB 1889. Rejecting the dissent's parade of horribles and
relying on comparable federal statutes that place restrictions on the
use of funds, the court finds that the statute does not deny employers' speech rights. Instead, the statute merely precludes state subsidization of such rights. 2 1 Consequently, there is no legally cognizable
impingement on plaintiffs' First Amendment privileges. 22 The Ninth
Circuit's opinion reinstates the contested provisions of AB 1889 because speech is not protected. The NLRA regulates this arena, albeit
in a limited way, which permits state regulation of conduct that involves "'interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility
that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, [it is difficult to] infer that Congress ha[s] deprived the States of power to
act.' ' 229 The court's examination of AB 1889, aided by persevering
abstractions about neutrality, establishes a firewall against preemption. Hence, the court vacates the judgment of the District Court.
C. A DissentingView
Judge Beezer dissented from the Ninth Circuit's cramped conception of the First Amendment and guarded understanding of the
222

Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Lockyer, 463 F.3d 1076, 1091 (9th Cir.

2006) (citations omitted), rev'd sub nom., Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v.
Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408 (2008).
223 Id.
224
Id.
25
Id. (citations omitted).
226 Id. ("Fitting a Garmon claim under the language of § 8(c) is awkward ....
[T] he activities described in § 8 (c) . . . are not 'protected by the NLRA, except from
the NLRA itself.'" (quoting UAW-Labor Employment & Training Corp. v. Chao, 325
F.3d 360, 364-65 (D.C. Cir. 2003))).
227 Id. at 1096-97.
228 Chamber of Commerce, 463 F.3d at 1096-97.
2" Id. at 1095 (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236,
243-44 (1959)).
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doctrine of preemption. He asked this clarifying question: "May a
state leverage its spending power to induce an employer to adopt a
neutral policy toward labor union organizing? 2 '0 Relying on the First
Amendment, the NLRA, and the well-established doctrine of preemption, he answered in the negative.5 Concentrating on the Constitution first, Judge Beezer showed that California extends "the definition
of 'state funds' to include any monies received by a private employer
as a result of contracting with the state [and accordingly] strikes at
the heart of the First Amendment. 2 2 Judge Beezer went on to state
that "AB 1889 prohibits not just the use of state money granted to an
employer for and under a specific program but also co-opts the payment for goods and services and profit realized under a contract
(undoubtedly not state funds) ."33 Hence the statute's rules "prevent
any employer from spending its own funds in direct violation of the
First Amendment., 23 4 Though this conclusion may be contestable because the majority opinion noted that the District Court made no
finding on this issue,3 5 Judge Beezer maintained correctly that AB
1889 interferes with "the First Amendment rights of employers to
speak out and discuss union organizing campaigns., 236 This can be
seen most directly with respect to employers who receive all of their
funds from the government. 23 7 Judge Beezer stated, "Employers who
receive all of their revenue from the state have no other option but to
cease all union-related speech. 2 8 He reasoned that "[s]imply because a business or individual chooses to contract with the state does
mean

that the state may abrogate First Amendment

rights."

23 9

Though the Ninth Circuit majority dismissed his analysis, it is doubtful that the majority's reasoning can contravene the full force of his
First Amendment observations.
Turning next to preemption, Judge Beezer explained that "l[t] he
NLRA is a comprehensive scheme designed to balance the rights and
interests of employers and employees,"240 which includes the free flow
of information. "[T]he NLRA explicitly protects the rights of em230

Id. at 1098 (BeezerJ., dissenting).

231

Id.

Id.
Id.
2" Chamberof Commerce, 463 F.3d at 1098 (BeezerJ.,
dissenting).
235 Id. at 1097.
23 Id. at 1098 (Beezer,J., dissenting).
232
233

237
238
239

240

Id. at 1100.
Id.
Id.
Chamberof Commerce, 463 F.3d at 1100 (Beezer, J., dissenting).
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ployers to express their views on union organizing efforts," and AB
1889 impedes the flow of information by regulating employer
speech.24' While claiming to function neutrally, the statute, as Judge
Beezer observed, prohibits expenditures related to labor union organizing but exempts from the statute's restrictions certain pro-union
activities and expenses, including expenditures incurred from voluntarily recognizing the union as the employees' representative. 42 Examined in its entirety, "the statute carries a false air of evenhandedness" because, in addition to the ongoing disinclination of employers
to favor unionization, it would be a rare set of circumstances "where
an employer [would] actually dedicate resources to encourage its
employees to unionize.2 43
Judge Beezer exposed California's less-than-neutral effort as a
regulatory mechanism that ought to be preempted for reasons that
implicate both prongs of the preemption doctrine. First, "a state law
that both explicitly targets and directly regulates processes controlled
by the NLRA is preempted under the Machinists doctrine."244 Federal
control is instantiated by a process of freeing a domain from regulations and authorizing the interplay of self-interested weaponry by the
parties. "Because AB 1889, on its face, directly regulates the union
organizing process itself and imposes substantial compliance costs
and litigation risk on employers who participate in that process using
the statutorily protected self-help mechanism, it interferes with"
NLRA sanctioned self-help. 245 Far from permitting self-help, the statute ties the hands of employer-recipients that oppose organizing,
while-contrary to its purported neutrality rationale-allowing prounion groups and compliant employers free reign. 246 Judge Beezer
asserted that "[b]y impeding the flow of information and substantive
discussions of unionization, the statute, [in addition to colliding with
the First Amendment, interferes with] 'Congress' [s] intentional balance between the uncontrolled power
of management and labor in
2 47
furthering their respective interests.'

241

Id.

242 Id. at

1102.

244

Id. at 1102-03.
Id. at 1105.

245

Id.

243

246 Chamber of Commerce, 463
247

F.3d at 1105 (BeezerJ., dissenting).
Id. at 1106 (BeezerJ., dissenting) (quoting Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council

v. Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc., 507 U.S. 218, 226 (1993)).

Additionally,

Judge Beezer states, "That California purports to act through its spending power rather than its regulatory power is a 'distinction without a difference.'" Id. (quoting
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Further, Judge Beezer concluded that AB 1889 is also preempted
under the Garmon doctrine.2

48

Because the "California statute stifles

employers' speech rights which are granted by federal law, and in
doing so, impedes the ability of the NLRB to uphold its election
speech rules and administer free and fair elections,"249 the state is attempting to regulate what the NLRA protects. As such, the statute
fails or at least potentially fails to comply with the substantiverights/ primary-jurisdiction component of Garmon. Taken as a whole,
the contested provisions of the statute silence employers. The state
of California is preempted from doing so by application of both the
NLRA and a principled interpretation of the Constitution itself.
Judge Beezer's views were vindicated, at least in part, by the Supreme
Court.
lV. THE SUPREME COURT

The Supreme Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's assessment of the law and the facts in the Chamber of Commerce case.
Precedent supports the Supreme Court. Linn v. United Plant Guard
Workers250 stands for the proposition that Congress has unmistakably
manifested its intent to encourage free debate on issues dividing labor and management. 25 1 If AB 1889 is a regulatory statute, this
prompts preemption analysis, possibly on two levels. If employer
speech is a protected activity, as Judge Beezer's dissent suggests, this
ought to trigger the Garmon prong. If the organizing domain constitutes a zone meant to be free of regulation as the district court determined, this sparks Machinists scrutiny. Lacking sympathy for the
thesis that its preemption analysis is "overbroad" or "too aggressive,"
the Supreme Court did not rely on the First Amendment, nor does
the Court rely on the Garmon doctrine. Instead, the Court insisted
that the challenged provisions are preempted under Machinists because they regulate within "a zone protected and reserved for market
freedom." 25 2 The Court supplied background:

Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282,
287 (1986)).
248 Id.
249 Id.
M Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
251

Id. at 62.

252

Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408, 2412 (2008) (quot-

ing Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Metro. Dist. v. Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc., 507 U.S. 218, 227 (1993). But see Letter from Paul M. Secunda, Professor
of Law, University of Mississippi School of Law, to Harry G. Hutchison, Professor of
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Among the frequently litigated issues under the Wagner Act were
charges that an employer's attempts to persuade employees not to
join a union[-]or to join one favored by the employer rather
than a rival [-] amounted to a form of coercion prohibited by § 8.
The NLRB took the position that § 8 demanded complete employer neutrality during organizing campaigns, reasoning that any
partisan employer speech about unions would interfere with the §
7 rights of employees.
Rejecting the requirement that employers must remain neutral in an
organizing context, in 1941 the Supreme Court "curtailed the
NLRB's aggressive interpretation, clarifying that nothing in the
NLRA prohibits an employer 'from expressing its view on labor policies or problems' unless the employer's speech 'in connection with
other circumstances [amount] to coercion within the meaning of the
Act.' ' 254 This analysis implies that state legislative efforts designed to
induce employer neutrality ought to be barred because such efforts
are not consistent with Supreme Court precedent.
Turning next to the Taft-Hartley Act, the Court found that Congress amended the Wagner Act for several reasons, including the goal
of providing language that "protects speech by both unions and employers from regulation by the NLRB. '' 25 According to the Court,
this amendment accomplishes several objectives. First, it incorporates and implements the First Amendment within the NLRA.2 6
Second, it manifests a "'congressional intent to encourage free debate on issues dividing labor and management.' 25 7 Perhaps relying
inordinately on the doctrine of preemption, and too little on the First
Amendment, the Court stated, "It is indicative of how important
Congress deemed such 'free debate' that Congress amended the
NLRA rather than leaving to the courts the task of correcting the
NLRB's decisions on a case-by-case basis.,' 258 Congress's policy judgment, which is suffused in the NLRA, favors "'uninhibited, robust and
wide-open debate in labor disputes. ' ' 259 Unlike the Ninth Circuit,
which found neither express nor implied protection for employers'

Law, George Mason University School of Law (October 17, 2008) (on file with the
author) (arguing that this reasoning should not be dispositive).
253
Chamber of Commerce, 128 S. Ct. at 2412 (2008).
2 Id. (quoting NLRB v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477) (1941)).
255
256

Id.

Id. (citing NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969)).
(quoting Linn v.United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 62 (1966)).
Id. at 2413-14.
Chamber of Commerce, 128 S.Ct. at 2414 (quoting Old Dominion Branch No.

257 Id.
258
259

496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 273 (1974)).
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speech, and distinct from typical preemption analysis where congressional intent can only be found implicitly, the Supreme Court determined that the NLRA expressly protects employers' non-coercive
speech.2 60 Discovering express protection may be helpful to employers and might potentially implicate Garmon's arguably protected
prong as well as Machinists' insulated zone of conduct analyses. The
Supreme Court explained:
California's policy judgment that partisan employer speech necessarily "interfere[s] with an employee's choice about whether to
join or to be represented by a labor union" [the express goal of
AB 1889], is the same policy judgment that the NLRB advanced
under the Wagner Act, and that Congress renounced in the TaftHartley Act. 261
Accordingly, "It] o the extent §§ 16645.2 and 16645.7 actually further
the express
goal of AB 1889, the provisions are unequivocally pre2 62
empted.
While the Ninth Circuit reasoned that it was implausible that
Congress intended California's restrictions on the use of state funds
to be preempted by the Machinists doctrine because the state's choices of how to spend its funds, by definition, are not controlled by the
free play of economic forces, the Supreme Court responded by finding the Ninth Circuit's analysis equally implausible. Moreover, the
Supreme Court was not persuaded by the Ninth Circuit's hypothesis
that there is a principled distinction between an organizing context
and a collective bargaining one for the purposes of judging whether
state regulation encroaches impermissibly on the federal scheme.
Specifically, the Court of Appeals declared that Machinists does not
"pre-empt §§ 16645.2 and 16645.7 for three reasons: (1) the spending
restrictions apply only to the use of state funds, (2) Congress did not
leave the zone of activity [organizing] free from all regulation, and
(3) California modeled AB 1889 on federal statutes., 26 3 The Supreme
Court maintained that none of these arguments are convincing.
Id. The Court asserted:
Section 8(a) and 8(b) demonstrate that when Congress has sought to
put limits on advocacy for or against union organization, it has expressly set forth the mechanisms for doing so.... Finally, the addition of §
8(c) expressly precludes regulation of speech about unionization "so
long as the communications do not contain a 'threat of reprisal or
force or promise of benefit."
Id. (quoting NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969)).
260

261
262
263

Id. (quoting 2000 Cal. Stat. ch. 872, § 1) (internal citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
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Neutrality and State Restrictions on the Use of State Funds

Whether the use of state funds as a device to regulate labor is
pre-empted depends "'on the nature of the activities [that] States
have sought to regulate, rather than on the method[s] of regulation
adopted.' 26 4 Courts must assess "'the actual content of the state's
policy and its real effect on federal rights.' '2 65 California cannot expressly and "directly regulate noncoercive speech about unionization;" equally clear, "California may not indirectly regulate such conduct through spending restrictions. ' 26 6 Citing Gould with approval,
the Court observed that a state's choice to use its spending power rather than its police power does not significantly lessen the potential
for conflict between state and federal schemes; therefore, such statutes are pre-empted.267 In California, this conflict was made tangible
by enacting AB 1889 to further the state's labor policy, 2 8 and this
conflict remains alive despite the state's ostensible commitment to
neutrality.
Though the Court of Appeals hung its persuasive powers on the
contention that the disputed statute is calculated to ensure state neutrality in labor matters, the Supreme Court showed that, in contrast
to a neutral affirmative requirement that funds be spent solely for the
purposes of the relevant grant or program, "AB 1889 imposes a tar'
geted negative restriction on employer speech about unionization. 26
"
Moreover, the Supreme Court and Judge Beezer emphasized that the
challengeable constraint is not applied uniformly.2 70 The Supreme
Court stated, "Instead of forbidding the use of state funds for all employer advocacy regarding unionization, AB 1889 permits use of state
funds for select [preferred] employer advocacy activities that promote unions. " 271 Hence the statute exempts employer "expenses incurred in connection with ... giving unions access to the workplace
2A64

Id. (quoting Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608,

614 n.5 (1986)).
26 Chamber of Commerce, 128 S.Ct. at 2414 (quoting Livadas v.
Bradshaw, 512 U.S.

107, 119 (1994)).

Id. at 2414-15.
Id. at 2415 ("In Gould, we held that Wisconsin's policy of refusing to purchase
goods and services from three-time NLRA violators was pre-empted under Garmon
because it imposed a supplemental sanction that conflicted with the NLRA's 'integrated scheme of regulation.'" (quoting Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor, & Human
Rels. v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 288-89 (1986)).
268 Id.
269 Id.
M Id.; Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer, 463 F.3d 1076, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2006)
2

267

(BeezerJ., dissenting).
271

Chamberof Commerce, 128 S. Ct. at 2415.
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2 72
and voluntarily recognizing unions without a secret ballot election."
The Ninth Circuit purported to distinguish Chamber of Commerce from
Gould "on the theory that AB 1889 does not make employer neutrality
a condition for receiving funds, but instead restricts only the use of

funds."2

73

Analytically, this constitutes a radical capitulation to neu-

trality rhetoric as a justifying rationale, but this surrender is unsustainable.
The Supreme Court found only a distinction without difference
between restrictions on the use of funds and restrictions on the receipt of funds. 74 Indeed, California's reliance on neutral "use" restrictions rather than on partisan "receipt" restrictions is "no more
consequential than Wisconsin's reliance on its spending power rather
than its police power in Gould."275 The Supreme Court reached this

conclusion for several reasons, including the fact that California
"couples its 'use' restriction with compliance costs and litigation risks
that are designed to make union-related advocacy prohibitively expensive for employers that receive state funds., 276 Consistent with this

examination, California makes it extremely "difficult for employers to
demonstrate that they have not used state funds" for prohibited purposes and "impose[s] punitive sanctions for noncompliance. 77 The
Court was persuaded that California has transmuted neutrality rhetoric into partisanship, which is outlawed by the NLRA.
Partisanship can be shown by the fact that the only safe harbor
the statute affords for recipients of state funds consists of activities
"that either favor unionization or are required by federal or state
law., 278 The Court was unconvinced by Justice Breyer's dissent claim-

ing that neutrality can be found by simply accepting the contention
that the challenged restrictions were only aimed at ensuring neutrality with regard to contested as opposed to uncontested organizing
campaigns.2

79

Rather, Justice's Breyer's contention unintentionally

but forcefully underscores the Court's principled understanding of
partisanship by showing that it is beyond question that the State of
California prefers one outcome rather than another
when employer80
recipients are engaged in an organizing campaign.
272

Id.

273

Id.

274

Id. at 2415-16.

276

Id.

275

277
278
279
2M

Id. at 2416.

Chamberof Commerce, 128 S. Ct. at 2416.

Id.
See infraPart IV.D.
See id.
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In light of the compliance burdens, non-trivial litigation risks,
and other factors vitiating allegations of neutrality, the Supreme
Court concluded that the statute's "enforcement mechanisms put
considerable pressure on an employer either to forego his 'free
speech right to communicate his views to his employees' . . . or else to
refuse the receipt of any state funds."2 8' This dilemma burdens em-

ployers' ability to use their own funds to advocate for or against unionization and underlines an inherent potential for conflict between
AB 1889 and the NLRA, 82 and between the California statute and the
First Amendment.2 " The statute impermissibly predicates benefits on
forcing employers to "refrain[] from conduct protected by federal labor law" and chills robust debate, which is protected by both the
NLRA and the doctrine of preemption. 2" The Court insisted that the
issue is not chiefly whether the challenged provisions of AB 1889 violate the First Amendment, nor is it whether such provisions are analogous to existing federal legislation that is not preempted by the
NLRA.28 Instead, the Court found the issue to be whether the statuand extory scheme "'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
28 6
ecution of the full purposes and objectives' of the NLRA.
While a state may choose funding restrictions to advance acceptable goals, it is impermissible "for a State to use its spending power to
advance an interest that--even if legitimate in the absence of the
NLRA... frustrates the comprehensive federal scheme established by
that Act., 287 This explication demonstrates that the First Amendment
interest of employers can be sheltered from intrusions that are
bounded by statutory analysis, but the Court declined to deploy the
robust exacting scrutiny required when deciding a case on the basis
of the First Amendment, preferring instead to hang its judgment on
whether the California statute hinders the accomplishment of the full
purposes of the NLRA.

281
282

Chamberof Commerce, 128 S. Ct. at 2416.

Id. at 2416-17.

Recall the Ninth Circuit's claim that AB 1889 does not "infringe employers'
First Amendment rights because employers remain free to use their own funds to advocate for or against unionization and are not required to accept neutrality as a condition for receipt of state grant and program funds." Chamber of Commerce of U.S.
v. Lockyer, 463 F.3d 1076, 1092 (9th Cir. 2006). The statute's enforcement mechanism arguably negates the Ninth Circuit's claim.
284

283
286
287

Chamberof Commerce, 128 S. Ct. at 2416-17.

Id. at 2417.

Id. (quoting Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 120 (1994)).
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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B. Does the NLRA Regulate Speech Concerning Organizing?
288 preemption isNext, the Supreme Court tackled the Machinists
sue directly by ascertaining whether organizing falls within a zone intended to remain free from state and federal regulations. The Court
rejected the claim that Machinists is inapplicable because the NLRB
has regulated election-eve employer speech, employer interviews with
employees in their homes immediately prior to an election, and
barred employers and unions alike from making speeches on company time to assemblies of employees within the twenty-four hours of
an election. 89 The Court pondered the purpose of such regulation
and concluded that the NLRB "has policed a narrow zone of speech
to ensure free and fair elections under the aegis of [section] 9 of the
NLRA" and noted that "Congress has clearly denied [the Board] the
authority to regulate the broader category of noncoercive speech encompassed by AB 1889. ' '290 Because, generally speaking, the NLRB is
without authority within this insulated domain, it is equally clear "that
the NLRA deprives California of this authority since '[t]he States
have no more authority than the Board to upset the balance that
Congress has struck between labor and management. ' ',29 The Supreme Court next turned its attention to the Ninth Circuit's dependence on analogies between the contested state legislation and federal statutes that similarly restrict the use of government funds, and
finds such analogies unavailing.

C. Preemption in the Mirrorof FederalStatutes
Conceding that it is clear beyond peradventure that "three federal statutes [relied upon by the court below] include provisions that
forbid the use of particular grant and program funds 'to assist, promote, or deter union organizing,'2' 9 2 the Supreme Court was not

convinced that "these few isolated restrictions, plucked from thousands [of] federal spending programs, were either intended to alter
or did in fact alter the 'wider contours of federal labor policy.'

2

93

The Court observed that "[a] federal statute will contract the
preemptive scope of the NLRA if it demonstrates that 'Congress has
decided to tolerate a substantial measure of diversity' in the particular regulatory sphere" but that is not the case with respect to the fed288
289
2W

291

23

Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzalez, 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
Chamber of Commerce, 128 S. Ct. at 2417.
Id.
Id. (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 751 (1985)).

Id. at 2417-18.
Id. at 2418 (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 753).
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eral statutes placed at issue in this litigation. 2 4 None of the three
federal statutes relied upon by the Court of Appeals either conflicts
with the NLRA or otherwise establishes that "Congress 'decided to tolerate a substantial measure of diversity' in the regulation of employer speech. 2

95

ernment-wide

Moreover, none of the federal statutes cited "is Gov-

in

scope,

none

contains

comparable

remedial

provisions, and none contains express pro-union exemptions.",

6

For

these and other reasons, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment
of the Ninth Circuit and sustained employer speech rights. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit had a point. Once federal statutes are allowed
to impede employer speech rights, it becomes doubtful that every
state statute attempting a similar feat can be credibly denied enforcement.
Thus understood, resting employer freedom-ofexpression rights on statutory interpretation may be a risky proposition.
C. A DissentingView
Justice Breyer (joined by Justice Ginsburg) was convinced that
California's spending limitations do not amount to regulation that
the NLRA preempts.

29

1

Conceding that Congress meant to encour-

age free debate, Justice Breyer did not "believe the operative provisions of the California statute amount to impermissible regulation
that interferes with that policy as Congress intended it."298 Justice

Breyer insisted that the only analogous case in the labor law pantheon is Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations. v.
Gould Inc., where the Court considered a Wisconsin statute prohibiting "the state from doing business with firms that repeatedly violated
the NLRA."2 He differentiated Gould and Chamberof Commerce by asserting that the "manifest purpose and inevitable effect" of the Wisconsin statute "was 'to enforce' the NLRA's requirements, which [is
the] role Congress reserved exclusively for the [NLRB],'"'

whereas

the California statute, "does not seek to compel labor-related activity.
And it does not forbid labor-related activity.

30

'

This contention

294 Id. (quoting New York Tel. Co. v. New York Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S.
519, 546
(1979) (plurality opinion)).
295 Chamber of Commerce, 128 S. Ct. at 2418.
296
297

Id.

Id. at 2419 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
Id.
Id. (citing Wisc. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Rels. v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S.

282 (1986)).
3W
301

Id. (quoting Gould, 475 U.S. at 291).
Chamber of Commerce, 128 S. Ct. at 2420 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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promises more than it delivers because Justice Breyer admitted that
California did have a labor relations objective-ending conflict regarding organizing when workers or labor unions desire to unionize
a given employer.0 ° Thus, a reasonable interpretation of the California statute suggests its regulatory purpose: to induce, if not compel,
agreement between labor and management as a device to favor unionization. However, there is more to Justice Breyer's claims.
Overlooking statutory exemptions that favor unionization and
failing to notice the importance of the statute's compliance and litigation burdens, Justice Breyer asserted that AB 1889 permits all employers who receive state funds to assist, promote, or deter union organizing if they so choose, but he merely precluded such activities on
the state's dime. 30 3 His analysis, if accepted, signifies that states wishing to pay for employer speech in a labor-organizing context are free
to do so.'
Additionally, he argued that the regulator/ marketparticipant distinction suggests a "false dichotomy" because "[t]he
30 5
converse of a 'market participant' is not necessarily 'regulator.'
This is so because a state "may appropriate funds without either participating in or regulating the labor market" and "the NLRA preempts a State's 'actions when taken as an appropriator,' only if those
actions amount to impermissible regulation. 3 0° Justice Breyer's inability to find a regulatory purpose is difficult to understand because
the State of California "abandoned [its] principal argument... that
AB 1889 serves a proprietary interest exempt from preemption."3 7
Instead, California conceded, "AB 1889's spending restriction was not
designed to achieve cost savings or programmatic efficiencies. Rather, California imposed a spending restriction on, or 'refus[ed] to
subsidize,' employer speech about unionization solely because 'the
legislature believed [that such speech] may interfere with an employee's choice about whether to join a union.' 3 0 8

A statute pre-

mised on the respondents' reading of the case is regulatory even if
Justice Breyer tried to evade the respondents' apparent concession
that places the asserted neutrality of the statute in doubt.

303

W
M4
305

Id.

Id.
Id.

Id.

Id. at 2421.

Id.
Reply Brief of Petitioners-Appellants at 1, Chamber of Commerce v. Brown,
128 S. Ct. 2408 (2008) (No. 06-939), 2008 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 295.
30
Id. at 1-2.
M06
307
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Justice Breyer continued by asserting that he is not convinced
that the statute's failure to apply spending restrictions uniformly is
fatal to the legislation. Instead, he offered a compliant syllogism:
permitting the expenditure of state funds (when such funds are used
to promote unionization) and precluding the use of said funds (when
used to deter unionization) fortifies an inference that is opposite to
the one reached by a majority of the Court. 309 Neutrality can be
found within "California's basic purpose-maintaining a position of
spending neutrality on contested labor matters. 3 0' Hence, "[w]here
labor and management agree on unionization, there is no conflict,"
and there is no need for the state to impose funding restrictions.
Another way of viewing Justice Breyer's claim is to accept (1)
that the proper outcome of any organizing campaign ought to culminate in unionization despite the express language of the NLRA
granting employees the right to refrain from joining a labor organization, (2) that neutrality can be understood as a postmodern idiom favoring unionization and disfavoring employers, and (3) that the language contained within the preamble to the California statute stating
it is the intent of the legislature to prohibit an employer from using
state funds to support or oppose unionization based on the state's
policy to refrain from interfering with an employee's choice to join or
not to join a union312 only applies when there is a contest about the
value of unionization. When such a contest takes place the neutrality
objective is transmuted into a device favoring labor unions.
Turning to compliance issues, Justice Breyer conceded that such
provisions may sink the statute on the shoals of preemption. He observed that on the record before the Court the evidence is insufficient to infer, let alone prove, that the compliance provisions, as a
practical matter, might unreasonably discourage the expenditure of
non-state funds by employers. 3' He would therefore decline to decide the compliance question until the lower courts
have had an op4
portunity to consider and rule upon this issue. 1
For a number of reasons, Justice Breyer could not find evidence
that the contested spending limitation amounts to regulation that the
NLRA preempts, which leads to several observations: (1) the State is
W Chamberof Commerce, 128 S. Ct. at 2421 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
310

Id.

311

Id.

2000 Cal. Stat. ch. 872 § 1.
"13Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408, 2421 (2008)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
312

314

Id. at 2422.
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free to refuse to pay for an activity it dislikes; (2) the congressional
parameters for free debate and a robust exchange of ideas about the
costs and benefits of unionization remain intact; (3) the State of California is neither participating in nor regulating the labor market in
impermissible ways; (4) the statute is tolerably neutral on the record
before the Court to enable a lower court to conclude that compliance
burdens are not fatal; and (5) the First Amendment interest of employers is inadequate to warrant constitutional protection.
V. ANALYSIS: ORGANIZING, PRESUPPOSITIONS, AND
FREEDOM OF SPEECH

Understanding the Chamber of Commerce case requires background that considers the central tendency of democratic societies.
John Gray's contribution to the proper understanding of modern
mass democracies intuits that modern "states tend overwhelmingly"
1 5 He argued that
to fail "to protect or promote the public interest.""
"[c] ontrary to the classical theory of the state as the provider of public good-goods, that is to say, which in virtue of their indivisibility
and non-excludability must be provided to all or none-modem states
are above all suppliers of private goods."' " Rather than provide the "pure
public good of civil peace," mounting evidence signifies that the mission of the modern state is "to satisfy the private preferences of collusive interest groups,"" 7 whether or not the pursuit of such aims is
cloaked in language implying some pure public purpose or alternatively, infused with the language of market failure."" It is possible,
therefore, to achieve private aims and objectives through government
processes more efficiently than by relying on market processes.19
Coherent with that possibility, "[m]odern democratic states have
themselves becomes weapons in the war of all against all, as rival in-

315

JOHN GRAY, POST-LIBERALISM: STUDIES IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 11 (1993).

Id.
Id. at 11-12; see also James M. Buchanan, The Constitution of Economic Policy, in
PUBLIC CHOICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 103, 107-08 (James D. Gwartney &
Richard E. Wagner eds., 1988).
316

317

318

WILLIAM C. MITCHELL & RANDY T. SIMMONS, BEYOND POLITICS: MARKET, WELFARE,

AND THE FAILURE OF BUREAUCRACY 1 (1994) (stating that "[t]he vision underlying the
expansion of regulation and bureaucracy is. that the government succeeds where
markets fail"). It is possible that welfare economists have dethroned markets in western countries and administered the coronation of government premised on the
claim of "undersupplied public goods, exorbitant and ubiquitous social costs of private action" and attached to the notion of "unfairly distributed wealth and income."
Id. at 3.
319

Id. at 108.
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terest groups compete with each other to capture government
and
3 20
use it to seize and redistribute resources among themselves.
It is doubtful that union advocates and their ideological allies
can be separated
from this centripetal tendency that afflicts demo•
21
cratic societies.
One of the quintessential objectives of union advocates is to silence employer speech. In part, this goal is tilted towards
a presumption that the employer is a third party to the transaction
between a union that seeks to represent workers and workers themselves. 2 2 It is true that workers, whether they have a job or not, can
choose a representative. But it is a mistake to emphasize the claim
that employers are simply "third parties.,

central to any employment agreement
ers or workers represented by a union.
survey evidence showing dissatisfaction
curate, 324 unions, union hierarchs, and

32

3

On the contrary, they are

that involves individual workEqually clear, if the mounting
with traditional unions is actheir allies can be seen as un-

wanted third parties. 325 Nevertheless, academic commentary has be-

come exercised by the possibility that employer hostility and coercion
is the primary factor hindering the restoration of labor's previously
ascendant position.2 6 Correspondingly, commentators have sought
to contract the scope of employers' property rights and to diminish
the reach of the doctrine of preemption. Commentators pursue employer neutrality via state and local legislation or other innovation,
and such efforts are then defended by the assertion that they have a
neutral objective: the removal of employer opposition.2 7

320

GRAY, supra note 315, at 4.

321 For

a discussion of these issues, see Hutchison, supra note 145, at 1339-48.
Bodie, supra note 11, at 53.
323 Id. at 53 (emphasizing the contention that employers
are an unwanted third
party).
324 See, e.g.,
Margalioth, supra note 95, at 41-49 (demonstrating that workers are
increasingly expressing dissatisfaction with collective solutions in the employment
context).
325
Harry G. Hutchison, Response, The Market for Union Representation:An Information Deficit or Rational Behavior?, VA. L. REv. IN BRIEF 15, 18 (2008), http://www.
virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2008/03/24/hutchison.pdf.
See, e.g.,
Richard B. Freeman, What do Unions Do? The 2004 M-Brane Stringtwister
Edition, in WHAT Do UNIONS Do? A TwENTy YEAR PERSPECrIVE 607, 627 (James T. Bennett & Bruce E. Kaufmann eds., 2004) (offering employer hostility as a highly influential explanation for labor union decline); see also FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note
83, at 185 (asserting that management has been given "near-veto power over whether
workers can achieve union representation").
!rn Debra Charish, Comment, Union Neutrality Law or Employer Gag Law? Exploring
NLRA Preemption of NEW YORK LABOR LAw SECTION 211-A, 14J. L. & POL'Y 779, 787, 789
(2006).
322
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By contrast, the two Justices (Powell and Burger) of the Machinists Court necessary to make up a majority asserted that "[s] tate laws
should not be regarded as neutral if they reflect an accommodation
of the special interest of employers, unions, or the public in areas
such as employee self-organization, labor disputes, or collective bargaining. '' 3 28 AB 1889 amounts to just such an accommodation of the
special interest of unions and the ideological allies who are animated
by the decline of labor over the last few decades.sn Labor advocates
have focused on the1.
ways in330which purported obstacles to union or•
ganizing can be eliminated.
In light of these developments, a correlative probability issues forth, suggesting that the Ninth Circuit has
proved capable of finding neutrality lurking in non-neutral legislation as a basis for trumping the First Amendment interest of employers.
A.

Neutrality Reflected in Three Questions

Given the Supreme Court debate and the Ninth Circuit wrangle,
the Chamber of Commerce case prompts three questions: First, does AB
1889, inconsistently with its stated neutrality rationale, require or encourage employer-recipient silence by virtue of the statutory compliance costs, litigation risk, and penalties arising from employerrecipient error when using state funds? Second, are these enhanced
transaction costs that accompany employer compliance error calculated to preclude employer-recipients from exercising their established right to engage in non-coercive, anti-organizing advocacy
funded by non-state funds? Third, does the fact that California purports to act though its spending power rather than its regulatory
power make a difference?
Preliminary analysis shows why the answers to such questions are
important. The first question is significant because the statutory penalties, compliance costs, and litigation costs can exceed the amount
of state funds that an employer-recipient receives. AB 1889, in addition to disgorgement, calls for a penalty of twice of the funds received
from the state.
The second question is pertinent given the plausible inference
that the costs imposed by AB 1889 are calculated to inhibit employerrecipients in exercise of their freedom-of-expression rights, even with
32
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aero. Workers v. Wis. Employment Relations
Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 156 n.* (Powell,J. and BurgerJ., concurring).
32
See, e.g., Feinstein, supra note 4, at 337-53.
330 Charles Heckscher, Organizations, Movements, and Networks,
50 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REv. 313, 313 (2006).
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respect to non-state funds. This inference comes alive despite the
possibility that employer-recipients can avoid such costs in three ways:
by declining to contract with or to receive state funds, by refraining
from all union advocacy designed to deter unionization, or by becoming an advocate for labor union organizing. In a word, the price of
cost avoidance is employer neutralization. This move may have an
adverse effect on employee rights to listen to a debate with regard to
the advantages and disadvantages of organizing.
The third question arises because AB 1889 could be framed as
an exercise of California's spending power, as opposed to its regulatory power, to defend against preemption and First Amendment invalidation, despite countervailing arguments by Judge Beezer.331 Justice
Breyer defended the Ninth Circuit's analysis by discounting the regulator/market-participant distinction and maintains that a "state may
appropriate funds without either participating in or regulating the
labor market so long as it appropriates without engaging in impermissible regulation.'032 That said, in order to more fully explain the
deductions that can be drawn from statutory analysis, this Article will
address the three questions below.
The Supreme Court majority supplied an affirmative answer to
the first two questions and a negative answer to the third. First, AB
1889 offers a capacious conception of neutrality with respect to restrictions on the use of state funds. This is not the first time that California offered the now-familiar rhetoric of neutrality in defense of
state regulation within the labor arena. To be fair, neutrality as a
concept often has an in-the-eye-of-the-beholder quality. But just like
a moral philosopher may not be a virtuous man and yet know everything about virtue,3 3 it is possible that a legislative body or a court
may know everything about neutrality conceptually, but cannot consistently apply the concept in practice or alternatively can only apply
neutrality as a weapon.
Golden State I gives substance to the observation that such a possibility has begun to infect Ninth Circuit adjudication. The City of
Los Angeles "conditioned renewal of a [taxicab] franchise on the setdement of [a] labor dispute" between the franchisee and the union
331

Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Lockyer, 463 F.3d 1076, 1106 (9th Cir.

2006) (Beezer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the "State of California purports to act
through its spending power rather than its regulator power is a distinction without a
difference").
332 Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Brown, 128
S.Ct. 2408, 2421 (2008) (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
333 JACQUES MARITAIN, NATuRAL LAw: REFLECTIONS ON THEORY
& PRACTICE 15 (William Sweet ed., 2001).
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representing its employees, who were on strike. The Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court judgment that the city's action was not
preempted under the NLRA.3 Conversely, the Supreme Court held
that such a condition "destroy[s] the balance of power designed by
Congress and frustrate[s] Congress' [s] intention to leave open the
use of economic weapons ,31; "a city cannot condition a franchise re' 36
newal in a way that intrudes into the collective bargaining process.
Evidently a state or local entity's desire to encourage a settlement or
to remain neutral during a labor dispute cannot control preemption.33 7 Instead, the court must decide if a state's rule conflicts with
or otherwise "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives" of federal law.33'
Other circuit courts have reached similar decisions dismissing
euphonious claims of neutrality as a defense to preemption when
proffered by state or local officials in an effort to legitimize a regulatory policy. 339 Still, evidence mounts that the Ninth Circuit has been

drawn to the persistent appeal of neutrality rhetoric. In Livadas, an
employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement within the
meaning of the NLRA was deprived of benefits generally made available to non-union workers.3 40 The Ninth Circuit, underscoring its dif-

ficulty with the concept of neutrality, accepted the state's contention
that because the plaintiff was covered by a collective bargaining
agreement, the state could not be required to enforce a provision of
the California Labor Code protecting the plaintiffs right to prompt
payment of wages. While this move depriving a unionized worker of
generally-available benefits cannot be seen as union favorable, it
represents an ever present possibility: states taking sides in an employment contest in order to accommodate one interest or another.
The preemption doctrine is properly calibrated precisely to preclude
this possibility. Hence, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the
Ninth Circuit and invalidated the California rule. The Livadas Court

334 Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 830
(9th Cir. 1985),
rev'd, 475 U.S. 608 (1986).
335 Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S.
608, 619 (1986).
336 Id.
337 See generally
id.
Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408, 2418 (2008)
339 See, e.g., Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v.
Caperton, 971 F.2d 1148, 1154 (4th Cir.

1992) (invalidating a state neutrality statute and holding that states may not, consistently with the NLRA, withhold protections of state anti-trespass law from employers
involved in labor disputes). The Supreme Court of the United States cited this case
with approval in Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 119 (1994).
Mo GORMAN& FINKIN, supra note 13, at 1108-09.
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reached its decision because a "rule predicating benefits on refraining from conduct protected by federal labor law poses special dangers of interference with congressional purpose,"m' and threatens the
Constitution's supremacy clause insofar as it interferes with or "stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full pur342
poses and objectives of the federal law.",
Claims of state neutrality often coexist with evidence showing
that the state has placed its thumb on the scale. This is a metaphor
for the precise evil that the Machinistsprong seeks to avoid-"the possibility that the state would alter the balance of power in a particular
labor conflict and thereby, subvert congressional intent that the matter be left free of government intervention."3 43 The Supreme Court
clarified, determining that "the NLRA forbids state policies that aid
or assist either party to a labor dispute" despite claims of neutrality.4
The Court defended federal power and the federal scheme by stating
that California's "hands off' policy poses a risk that the freedoms and
"advantages conferred by federal law will be canceled out and its objectives undermined, and those dangers are not laid to rest by profes34 5
sions of the need for governmental neutrality in labor disputes."
Apparently, poignant appeals to neutrality rhetoric are no substitute for sound preemption analysis. Still, the Ninth Circuit defended
its Chamber of Commercejudgment by insisting on a crabbed conception of "neutrality." This maneuver brings to mind the Jacobins' reliance on words to transform society during the aftermath of the
French Revolution. French social critic Alain Finkielkraut showed
that the Jacobins insisted on the substitution a single wordassociates-for the nation's history and its rich tradition of social and
political relationships346 as a vehicle to ensure social progress and to
ignore the carnage. The end result of this transformative process was
to catalyze accretions in state power and to diminish the liberty of putatively free people. Similarly, in Chamber of Commerce, the Ninth Circuit solicited the persuasive force of the word "neutrality" in order to
defend AB 1889 and to enhance the power of the state by legitimizing
California's pro-union policies while eviscerating employers' liberty
interest in freedom of speech. Just like the Jacobins, the Ninth Cir3

Livadas, 512 U.S. at 116.
120.
DOUGLAS E. RAY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING LABOR LAW, 376-77 (1999).
Livadas, 512 U.S. at 130.

342 Id. at
33
M4

345

Id. at 129 (citing Brown v. Hotel Int'l Union Local 54, 468 U.S. 491, 501

(1984)).
346

ALAIN FINKIELKRAuT, THE DEFEAT OF THE MIND 10-11 (Judith Friedlander trans.,

1995).
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cuit's solicitation flounders in the face of a principled conception of
words, such as neutrality.
In order to fully ascertain whether California enacted a policy
that aids or assists labor unions and disadvantages employers, the Supreme Court emphasized that employers have a freedom-ofexpression right that section 8(c) of the NLRA specifies. Contrary to
the Ninth Circuit's Chamber of Commerce conjecture that section 8(c)
supplies no protection to employer speech in the context of organizing but merely shelters non-coercive speech from supporting an unfair labor practice charge, the Supreme Court held that employers
have a right worth protecting. Properly understood, AB 1889 is calculated to aid unions by depriving the organizing contest of the employer's voice and ensuring that employees cannot hear that voice.
Claims of neutrality cannot shelter this maneuver and this is particularly true when pro-union advocacy escapes the preclusive reach of
the statute.
Second, AB 1889 distributes enhanced transaction costs in the
form of employer-recipient compliance expenses as well the penalty
for employer error. These costs establish spillover effects that deter
the exercise of employer-recipients' speech rights with respect to
their use of non-state funds. Deterrence takes a tangible and punitive
form that unreasonably discourages the expenditure of non-state
funds by employer-recipients during organizing contests for fear of
violating the statute. This is so because the provisions of AB 1889 regulating employer-recipient error in the use of funds are designed to
capture several times the amount of state funds received. Taken together, a credible inference surfaces suggesting the statute, couched
in language that purports to vindicate the state sovereign interests in
neutral restrictions on the usage of funds, actually reflects a predisposition to neutralize employer-recipients' speech entirely. Consistent
with this possibility, even Justice Breyer was willing to concede that
compliance costs might sink the statute on the shoals of preemption.
In answering the third question, it is doubtful that a statute designed to interfere with the employer-recipients' speech rights by
placing restrictions on the use of state funds, and that has the effect of
inhibiting employer's speech with respect to their own funds constitutes a legitimate exercise of California's spending power. In order
to deprive the statute of its regulatory purpose, observers must yield
to imaginary claims of neutrality and ignore: (1) evidence showing
that "AB 1889 permits the use of state funds for select employer ad-
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vocacy activities that promote unions"0 7 and (2) the fact that the state
of California apparently concedes the statute's regulatory purpose.34 8
Given the non-neutral purpose and effect of the statute, and in light
of California's apparent concession, the appropriate outcome becomes observable: "a state may not leverage its spending power to in'' 4
duce employers to adopt a neutral policy toward union organizing. 1
The fact that California purports to act through its spending power
rather than its regulatory power makes no difference, because AB
1889 interferes with Congress's intention to create a zone free from
regulation.
The three questions discussed above rely largely on the intersection of neutrality and preemption doctrine for answers. It is doubtful
that the answers, however definite they may be, constitute an adequate defense of employer speech rights. Evidence can be adduced
showing that some judges and legislatures have capitulated to the
surging commentary directed toward reversing the ongoing decline
in unionization as intensified by the appeal of postmodern discourse.
Therefore, two additional inquiries emerge: First, given the possibility that the Ninth Circuit, and by extension the judiciary, have
been captured by a predisposition to accept the legitimacy, if not the
necessity, of state labor regulation favoring unions, does statutory
analysis, standing alone, constitute an effective barrier to labor regulation and judicial language that shrinks employer speech rights?
Second, can a return to the First Amendment itself offer stronger, if
not permanent, protection for such rights?
B. Inclinations?
It is possible to uncover evidence implying that Ninth Circuit adjudication exemplifies the possibilities associated with postmodern
discourse. This development may arouse doubts about the long-term
viability of the liberal-legalist project while sustaining the observation
that the courts are susceptible to capture. Analogical data sustains
the tentative inference that the Ninth Circuit panel, like other officials in liberal democratic societies, is predisposed to favor one side
or another in the contest for political power. As such, the Supreme

Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408, 2415 (2008).
Reply Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 1, Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v.
Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408 (2008) (No. 06-939), 2008 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 295.
349 Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Lockyer, 463 F.3d 1076, 1098
(9th Cir. 2006)
(BeezerJ., dissenting).
347

38
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Court has had occasion to correct the Ninth 5Circuit and vindicate the
First Amendment rights of union dissenters.1
The vulnerability of the Ninth Circuit's analysis is highlighted by
examining briefly two of the court's recent decisions emphasizing
that organizing expenditures and activities can be justified against
union dissenters' freedom-of-expression claims. This paradigm suppresses union dissenters' freedom-of-expression claims in exchange
for the goal of strengthening labor unions. The Ninth Circuit's susceptibility to this objective takes on additional weight given the propensity of the court to favor neutrality rhetoric as a device that
trumps the preemption doctrine.3 "
Within the tightly-contested category that is bound by the clash
of freedom-of-expression claims and compulsory union dues, the
Ninth Circuit's willingness to favor union organizing as a goal while
disfavoring freedom of expression has drawn a sharp rebuke from the
Supreme Court. In Ellis, the Court held that the union's rebate
scheme was inadequate, and that the Ninth Circuit erred in finding
that the Railway Labor Act authorizes a union to spend compelled
dues for general litigation and organizing efforts352 deemed necessary
to ensure and improve union strength.5
Ellis was extended to the
Beck case wherein the Supreme Court confirmed 35that
the principles
4
adduced in Ellis apply in the context of the NLRA.
30 Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 528 (1991)
(plurality opinion)
(citing Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline, & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 453 (1984)). In Lehnert, a four-member plurality held that the "[First] Amendment proscribes such assessments in the public sector." Id. at 528.
35 See supra Part V.A (discussing Golden State land Livadas).
352Ellis, 466 U.S. at 441 (holding that the "union's rebate scheme was inadequate
and that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals erred in finding that the Railway Labor
Act authorizes a union to spend compelled dues for its general litigation and organizing efforts").
353Id. at 441. The Court stated:
Turning to the question of permissible expenditures, the Court of Appeals framed "the relevant inquiry [as] whether a particular challenged
expenditure is germane to the union's work in the realm of collective
bargaining.... [That is, whether it] can be seen to promote, support
or maintain the union as an effective collective bargaining agent." The
court found that each of the challenged activities strengthened the union as a whole and helped it to run more smoothly, thus making it better able to ...negotiate and administer agreements.

Id.

354UFCW v. NLRB, 249 F.3d 1115, 1117-20 (9th Cir. 2001), withdrawn, and
overruled by, 307 F.3d 760 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (concluding that the Ellis decision
held organizing expenses to be outside of Congress's authorization in section 2, Eleventh of the RLA, followed by the Beck decision, which found statutory equivalence
between the NLRA and the RLA, and the Lehnert case confirming that RLA cases in-
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Nonetheless, contemporary evidence shows that the Ninth Circuit has legitimized union-organizing activities in particular, and unionization in general, on grounds that such efforts are mandated by
the goal of strengthening and expanding unions, 355 despite the determination by an unanimous Court in Ellis "that it would be perverse
to" compel dues objectors to finance the expansion of unionism to
other bargaining units. 35

Disagreeing with the Ellis Court's assess-

ment of perversity, the Ninth Circuit stated in United Food, "Because
the union can only become the collective bargaining representative if
enough employees agree, the initial recruitment and incorporation
of new members into a nascent bargaining unit through organizing is
crucial. 35 7 This opinion is underwritten by tolerating the contention
that extra-bargaining unit organizing is necessary and, therefore, defensible despite the complainants'
free-speech claims and the exis35 8
tence of contrary precedent.

The United Food Court reached the following conclusions, which
coincide with its implicit agreement with the objectives associated
with AB 1889:
(1) the organizing of competitor employees "eliminates the competition of employers and employees based on labor conditions
regarded as substandard." (2) nonunion employers will tend to
"pay lower wages and provide lesser benefits," and (3) "competition from non-unionized employers "significantly weakens the union's ability to bargain with [already-organized] employers], and
decreases the union's prospects of achieving the economic objectives of the members of the bargaining unit.
These arguments are dubious3 ° and raise the probability that the
court has been captured by an inclination to expand unions, a conclusion that underscores its holding in Chamber of Commerce. Still, the
cluding Ellis, serve to determine the scope of the chargeable activities under the
NLRA, and therefore union organizing expenses cannot be authorized by the
NLRA).
355 See, e.g., Ellis v. Bhd. Of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 685 F.2d
1065, 1075 (9th Cir.
1982); UFCW,307 F.3d at 771.
Ellis, 466 U.S. at 452 n.13.
357 UFCW, 307 F.3d at
768.
In analyzing the UFCW case, the Ninth Circuit attempted to distinguish cases
arising under the NLRA from cases like Ellis arising under the Railway Labor Act despite the Supreme Court's claim in Beck that because section 8(a) (3) of the NLRA
and section 2, Eleventh of the RLA "are in all material respects identical," RLA cases

are "more than merely instructive, they are controlling" for purposes of understanding the free-rider approach taken by Congress. Commc'n Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S.
735, 745-47 (1988).
359 UFCW, 307 F.3d at 768-69.
3W SeeHutchison, supra note 145, at 1357-1401.
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United Food Court's opinion, which burdens freedom of expression,
is reinforced by observing that the Supreme Court, unsurprisingly, is
not inclined to grant certiorari in all such cases. The Court has often
deferred the determination of which labor union activities are defendable against freedom-of-speech claims brought by complainants
to the appellate courts.m2 Bright-line guidance in such situations
might be helpful.
If this potential quandary is extended to the employer speech
rights domain, and if lower courts are free, in practice, to ignore
precedent, it becomes likely that freedom-of-expression claims will be
litigated and re-litigated, thus providing continuing opportunities for
elucidation. This is so despite the Supreme Court's recurring admonition that a given state scheme must be evaluated on the basis of
whether it stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of the NLRA. The accomplishment of such goals and objectives may depend on whether there
is a uniform or elastic understanding of the NLRA's purposes. Comprehensive elucidation must admit that the Supreme Court has approved or, at the very least, has not overruled the validity of federal
statutes that appear to have the same purpose as AB 1889.363 That observation should give us pause, even if it does not negate the evidence
suggesting that elucidation in the chambers of the Ninth Circuit or
deliberation within the California legislature favors organizing activities and disfavors freedom-of-expression rights of employers and dissenting workers. Recall the Ninth Circuit's decision making in Golden
State /and Livadas, which suggests a propensity to accept statutes sheltered from invalidation by neutrality rhetoric. The Chamber of Commerce case offers another occasion for the Supreme Court to rectify
the Ninth Circuit's decision making. However, the relevant inquiry
becomes whether the Supreme Court's focus on statutory interpretation is sufficient to defend the freedom-of-expression rights of employers and prevent states from placing their finger on the scale in
order to favor one side in the absence of clear protection supplied by
the First Amendment itself.
C.

The FirstAmendment as a Source of Employer Rights?

Any discussion of freedom-of-expression rights and the First
Amendment must note that the doctrines, which plague this arena,
Id. at 1384-94.
See, e.g., UFCW v. NLRB, 284 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S.
1024 (2002).
See supraPart IV.C.
36

32
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are irreducibly complex, conducing to a process that is at once engaging and repelling. Centuries of equivocation, coupled with infection by cumbersome words and doctrines, signify that plain meaning
of both the law of freedom of expression and the language of the
First Amendment may not mean what they say. Properly appreciated,
contemporary-rights talk presents it own set of problems, not least,
the possibility that much of it is unworkable."' Still, consistent with
the intuition of Professor Wolterstorff, it may be "a mistake to dismiss
or resist inherent rights, as atomizing emanations from the Enlightenment, fourteenth-century nominalism, or the grandiose narcissism
that pervades so many Supreme Court decisions." 63 The necessity of
deploying constitutional safeguards to prevent an impermissible impingement of employer's speech rights takes on added urgency given
the fact that the insulated sphere of labor activity presently supervised
by the Machinists doctrine has not always been free of state regulation."' This implies that the present preemption epoch may be
merely a prologue to the past.
Returning to the past requires a brief examination of the status
of employer-speech rights before the Wagner Act was amended adding section 8(c), which provides explicit protection for employer
speech within an organizing context. Virginia Electric & Power, as confirmed by the Supreme Court's subsequent holding in Thomas v. Collins, situates employer and labor union efforts to persuade workers to
join or refrain from joining a union within the First Amendment's
guaranty. 67 Virginia Electric & Power bears witness to the judgment
that provably hostile conduct by an employer who suggested that its
employees form an "independent" union to bargain on their behalf
cannot bar First Amendment protection for employer speech. 68 As
part of its campaign, the employer, Virginia Electric & Power Company, "gave impetus to, and assured the creation of, an 'inside' organization, and coerced its employees in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed by § 7 of the Act."3
The NLRB found that company
s6

Richard W. Garnett, Righting Wrongs and Wronging Rights, FIRST THINGS, Oct.

2008, at 48, 48 (reviewing NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, JUSTICE: RIGHTS AND WRONGS

(2007)).
W'

Id.

Sw See, e.g., GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 13, at 1103 (citing Automobile Workers
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board [Briggs-Stratton] 336 U.S. 245 (1949) for
the proposition that the Supreme Court has not always prevented states from regulatinvthis insulated zone); see also supra Part II.
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537-38 (1945) (citing Labor Bd. v. Va. Elec. &
Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941)).
Sm Va. Elec. & Power, 314 U.S. at 470-74, 477.
B Id. at 474.
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speeches arranged on company property and on company time as
well as a bulletin posted on company property7 1 constituted conduct
that interfered, restrained, and coerced the company's employees in
violation of section 7 of the NLRA. 7 ' The NLRB "concluded that the
Company had committed unfair labor practices within the meaning
of § 8 (1), (2), and (3) of the Act. 72 The NLRB issued an order directing the company "to cease and desist from its unfair labor practices and from giving effect to its contract with Independent [inside
union] .379 The court of appeals denied enforcement of the Board's
order and petition for writs of certiorari followed 74
In its appeal to the Supreme Court, Virginia Electric & Power
Co. argued that the bulletin and the speeches on company property
could not form the basis of the NLRB's order because such an order
is repugnant to the First Amendment. The Supreme Court responded by holding:
Neither the Act nor the Board's order here enjoins the employer
from expressing its view on labor policies or problems, nor is a
penalty imposed upon it because of any utterance which it has
made. The sanctions of the Act are imposed.., for the protection of the employees. The employer in this case is as free now as
ever to take any side it may choose on this controversial issue. 75
Ultimately, this case was sent back to the Board "for a redetermination of the issues. 76 Propositionally, Virginia Electric &
Power imparts substance to the contention that fear of coercion and
even rampant hostility cannot be seen as sufficient to deprive employers of their First Amendment rights, despite the NLRB's early history demanding employer neutrality during organizing campaigns. 77
Thus, contemporary state labor innovation (such as AB 1889), motivated by the employer-hostility thesis, and leading to a correlative endeavor to neutralize employers should have difficulty surviving in the
face of this rather clear principle.
Correctly characterized, Virginia Electric & Power affirms the
proposition that employers have a First Amendment right "to engage
in non-coercive speech about unionization." 7 " Given the Supreme
370

Id. at 471-74.

37 Id. at 476-77.
37

Id. at 475.

575 Id.
374

Va. Elec. &Power, 314 U.S. at 476.

575Id. at

477.

376

Id. at 479-80.

$77

See Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408, 2413 (2008).

578

Id.
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Court's determination that section 8(c) amended the Wagner Act to
make manifest Congress's "intent to encourage free debate on issues
dividing labor and management," 379 it is important to note that free
debate, to be meaningful, cannot countenance a regime that permits
the enactment and enforcement of statutes that deprive only one side
of the right to speak.
Decision making energetically tied to the First Amendment
stands on the conviction that, as a general rule, intrusions upon the
domain protected by the First Amendment can only be supported "if
grave and impending public danger requires this., 38 0 No evidence of
a grave and impending danger was presented justifying the enactment of AB 1889, and hence this statute ought to be forcefully disallowed pursuant to First Amendment norms. The weight of First
Amendment scrutiny is fortified by noting that corporations and other employers have full constitutional speech rights," which protect
them "from unlawful state deprivations of liberty."' 8' This gives rise to
the desirable inference that the First Amendment ought to act as a
bulwark against state labor regulation that intrudes on this right and
implies that statutory protection of employer speech rights can be
seen, at least in part, as a gratuitous enactment.
Still, whether statutory protection is gratuitous or not, neutrality
as a malleable concept overhangs this debate. This concept is difficult because there is an interminable character of much of what
passes for Americans' contemporary moral and philosophical debates. 383 The ever-increasing scope of these debates and the profound depth of cultural division combine to reflect a "clash of orthodoxies" on a number of levels.38 4 Thus, reaching agreement on
something as essential as the meaning and shape of neutrality in societies proffering a continued allegiance to liberalism is apt to be
challenging. The complexity of such a venture may succumb to ambiguity.

Id. (quoting Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 62 (1966)).
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 532 (1945).
381 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 256-59 (2003) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (stating that the true interpretation of Bellotti means that corporations have full constitutional speech fights).
M2' Baworowsky, supra note 29, at 1748.
3"8 MAcINTiRE, supra note 24, at 226.
379

8O

W84
ROBERT P.

GEORGE, THE CLASH OF ORTHODOXIES: LAW, RELIGION, AND MORALIY

IN CRISIS (2001); see also Harry G. Hutchison, Shaming Kindergarteners? Channeling

Dred Scott? Freedom of Expression Rights in Public Schools 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 361, 36168 (2007).
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Consider the Ninth Circuit's assertion that neutrality is made
concrete by preventing employers from using state funds when employers "attempt to influence employee choice about whether to join
a union. '' 38

Relying primarily on statutory analysis, the Ninth Circuit

finds that both prongs of the preemption doctrine are inapplicable
despite evidence demonstrating that the State of California has attempted to regulate labor, compounded by unmistakable evidence
showing that the restrictions on the use of state funds are excused if
and when the employer takes steps to voluntarily recognize the union. To be sure, the Supreme Court disagrees with the Ninth Circuit's assessment of neutrality, finding employer speech within the
preemptive remit of the NLRA. Accordingly, assertions of state neutrality could not defend a statute that does not appear to be neutral
on its face or as applied.
However, it is also true that this dispute regarding the permissible reach of AB 1889 provides further proof that when state policies
are contested within boundaries furnished by liberal societies, the
elastic language of neutralitym6 has its uses and in some quarters it
may have many definitions. Given an unsettled world wherein modern states fail to protect the public interest, conflict regarding the
provision of private preferences of collusive interest groups may be a
null hypothesis. In such a world, state neutrality may be a difficult if
not impossible proposition to sustain. Further support for this deduction can be found because of the existence of viable federal statutes. Like AB 1889, these statutes restrict the use of federal funds to
assist, promote, or deter union organizing. Implicitly, the Supreme
Court accepted the neutrality of such federal statutes, which arguably
provided private benefits, by relying on the contestable contention
that a few isolated restrictions fail to alter the wide contours of federal labor policy. 87

This development may expose the Supreme Court

to the charge of hypocrisy.
Any kind of interpretation-statutory or constitutional-existing
outside a boundary cabined by a shared understanding of truth, liberty, and justice unavoidably prepares liberal-legalist societies for a
dead end: despotisms designed to support largely private beneficia38

3M

Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Lockyer, 463 F.3d 1076, 1084 (9th Cir. 2006).

For a less elastic conception of neutrality, see Rum Creek Coal Sales v. Caper-

ton, 926 F.2d 353 (4th Cir. 1991), which refuses to defer to a West Virginia law that
exempted labor activity from state trespass law. See also Estlund, supra note 34, at 341
("What West Virginia saw as neutrality, the Fourth Circuit viewed as state partisanship

favoring labor.").
See supra Part IV.C.
3M

LOUGHLIN,

supra note 1, at 5.
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ries. At the same time, Richard Pildes contends that the "most urgent
problem in the design of democratic institutions today is how best to
design such institutions in the midst of seemingly-profound internal
heterogeneity, conflict and group difference." ' 9 This comment,
aimed at resolving differences over ethnic identity, has equally poignant implications for a wide array of issues that coincide with the
postmodern conclusion that "our world has fallen apart" and that we
live at the end of the neoclassical age as society struggles through
feelings of confusion and helplessness that confirm "the 'real' world
lacks reality. 39 1 Coextensively, America faces a continuing struggle
among combatants to transmute the existing design of democratic institutions and utilize the power of government, including the courts,
to extract largely private benefits. Whether intertwined with statutory
preemption analysis, incipient federalism, or constitutional interpretation, liberal democratic states have struggled to fashion and sustain
fundamental freedoms, despite the possibility that liberal societies,
including our own, are drawn to the conclusion that at least one fundamental freedom-freedom of speech-constitutes an absolute
right.3 11 While it is clear that employers and corporations have been
and continue to be included within the protective envelope provided
by the constitutional guarantee of free speech,392 a struggle to maintain coherence regarding employer speech rights ensues. The contours of this struggle may come into view as an uncompromising surrender to paradox because the freedoms that are emblematic of
liberalism-the freedoms of expression, religion, and association-all

389 Richard H. Pildes, Ethnic Identity and Democratic Institutions: A Dynamic Perspec-

tive,

in

CONSTITUTIONAL

DESIGN

FOR

DIVIDED

SOCIETIES:

INTEGRATION

OR

173, 173 (Sujit Choudry ed., 2008).
390 Fredrick Mark Gedicks, Spirituality, Fundamentalism,Liberty:
Religion at the End of
Modernity, 54 DEPAUL L. Rzv. 1197, 1197-98 (2006).
Sol Evidently, 'Justices Black and Douglas championed an absolutist view of free
speech," but a majority of the United States Supreme Court has never adopted it.
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 47, § 16.7(b).
$92 See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767, 785 (1978) (reversing
the lower court's holding that the First Amendment rights of a corporation are limited to issues that materially affect its business, property, or assets and finding no
support in the First or Fourteenth Amendments for the proposition that speech,
which otherwise would be within the protection of the Constitution, is outside of
constitutional protection, simply because its source is a corporation.) Justice Burger
concurred in the opinion and judgment stating that "a disquieting aspect of Massachusetts' position is that it may carry the risk of impinging on the First Amendment
rights of those who employ the corporate form-as many do-to carry on the business of mass communications"; suggesting that it may be impossible to distinguish
what qualifies and what does not qualify for protection under the state's approach.
Id. at 796 (Burger, J., concurring).
ACCOMMODATION?
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appear to require a governmental stance of evaluative neutrality. 93
Properly evaluated, freedom of expression for those
with whom the
4
government agrees is not freedom of expression. 1
The implications of that observation provide constitutional
ground to defend actual neutrality as a concept in practice rather
than a cramped and largely rhetorical notion that shelters innovative
state legislation and adjudication, whenever shelter is desired. Still, it
is worth noting that neutrality may be a stance that is impossible to
sustain in practice. Employer freedom-of-speech rights, which rest on
the Constitution, ought to rest more securely than speech rights,
which depend solely on statutory analysis. However, problems remain. Larry Alexander noticed that any philosophical account of political morality must take a stand on what is true, right, and valuable
and what is not.' 9' Despite the fact that free speech occupies a "preferred position" compared to the majority of rights in the U.S. Constitution, 9 and despite the frequent invocation of the claim that government officials when legislating or adjudicating are engaged in an
ongoing effort to maintain neutrality, the state "will and must be 'partisan' in favor of its own conclusions. Thus, it must regard as error
and possibly malign those ideas that it rejects." 97 Without a shared
understanding of truth, justice, and liberty, it is unlikely that a way
can be found to resolve such disputes on terms that all will agree are
just. It is not clear that the Constitution can be relied upon in a society where doubts flourish about the possibility of attaining philo9 9 and where political liberalism may be "devoid
sophical liberalism
of
3 99
deep conviction."
These various developments may give rise to pessimism and provide a negative answer to Professors Scaperlanda and Collett's haunting question: "[H] ow can 'law' ... facilitate America's ongoing experiment with representative self-governance" if society "[has] lost its
shared moral foundations?""0 Though Chamber of Commerce, in all of
393

LARRY ALEXANDER,

594

Id.

395

Id.

Is THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM

OF EXPRESSION

148 (2005).

390NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 47, § 16.7(a).
397 ALEXANDER, supra note
393, at 148-49.

398 Larry Alexander, Illiberalism All the Way Down: Illiberal Groups and Two Conceptions of Liberalism, 12 J. OF CONTEMp. LEGAL ISSUES, 625, 625 (2002) (citing Stanley
Fish, Mission Impossible: Setting the Just Bounds between Church and State, 97 COLUM. L.
REv. 2255 (1997)).
399 Id.

Michael A. Scaperlanda & Teresa Stanton Collett, Introduction to RECOVERING
SELF-EVIDENT TRUTHS 1, 2 (Michael A. Scaperlanda & Teresa Stanton Collett eds.,
2007).
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its permutations but particularly the Ninth Circuit's opinion, illustrates the difficulty of settling disputes about statutory interpretation,
the implications of this difficulty come alive with equal force with respect to constitutional analysis. It is unlikely that a liberal democratic
state can sustain its ostensibly neutral stance on anything, including
union organizing, unless it recaptures what is arguably missing in
American society: a shared understanding of essentials, such as truth,
because it is not possible to live in a democratic society that papers
over deeply antagonistic world-views, except temporarily. This quandary implies that endless elucidation may be the looming destination
of all debates, including the employer free speech wrangle.
VI. CONCLUSION

"From the beginning or, to be more precise, from the time of
Plato to that of Voltaire, human diversity was judged in the court of
fixed values. Then came Herder, who turned things around. He had
universal values condemned in the court of diversity., 40 ' As the nation embraces diversity, internal heterogeneity characterizes America's democracy. Diversity, specifically in its cosmopolitan form and
particularly in all of its dimensions, suggests an obvious conclusion to
the resolution of conflicts over fundamental rights and freedoms: the
impossibility, if not the undesirability, of reaching a consensus that
represents universal claims regarding justice, truth, and liberty.
Americans now make up a culture that verifies philosopher Chantal
Delsol's rich description of a postmodern "society that is waiting, but
does not know what it is waiting for."4 2 Though liberty may "promote
individual and social progress ' 403 coextensively with the boundary
administered by eternal vigilance, it is improbable that preemption
analysis tied to statutory interpretation of the NLRA or constitutional
adjudication that concentrates on fundamental freedoms can offer
hope for a permanent resolution of society's budding debates. As
such, employer free speech rights, however justifiable and desirable,
face an indeterminate future.

" FINKIELKRAUT, supra note
40'

346, at 9.

CHANTAL DELSOL, ICARus FALLEN: THE SEARCH FOR MEANING IN AN UNCERTAIN

WORLD, at xxvii (2003).
403 Patrick Hayden, Introduction to JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, at vii, xiii

(2004).
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